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The concern of this study mainly arises from the necessity of pro-
tecting software-related inventions effectively. It is set against the
backdrop of the rapid development of e-commerce related technolo-
gies and the sharp increase in the number of resulting patent applica-
tions. In spite of many debates,' computer programs are now
protected by patents in the European Patent Office (EPO), the
United States of America (US), and Japan. Patents can also be ob-
tained for software-implemented business methods in the US.
One of the main problems of the patent system in protecting
computer programs in general, and business methods in particular,
concerns regarding the economics of software innovation. There have
been many disputes over the proper level of protection for software-
related inventions. Proponents for software patenting argue that pat-
ent protection will encourage more innovation in the software indus-
try. Opponents maintain that software patenting will stifle innovation,
because the characteristics of software are basically different from
those of the inventions of old industrial society, e.g. mechanics and
civil engineering. 2
According to the study on the fundamental question of whether
or not protecting software by existing legal regimes (i.e. patent, copy-
right and trade secrecy) is optimum and desirable in light of innova-
tion economics, the existing regimes have a number of disadvantages
as well as advantages. The existing proprietary regimes do not provide
appropriate protection for software innovation. They are not in har-
mony with the characteristics of software and its development as well
as the vulnerability of software innovations. The development of the
t Dr. Koo has a PhD in Law. He studied at the University of Sheffield, U.K. After
working at the Korean Intellectual Property Office; Dr. Koo is now a professor at the
College of Law of Seoul National University.
I In the US, software was generally considered excluded from patent protection until
the late 1980's court decisions.
2 Daehwan Koo, Patent and Copyright Protection of Computer Programs, INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY QUARTERLY, 2002, 2, 172-211.
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Internet has significantly reduced the cost of copying and increased
the risk that small-scale innovators will keep their know-how secret.
The vulnerability of sub-patentable innovations to copiers generates
fears of market failure. Patents can protect the idea or concept in
computer programs, which may have great value. If developing
software requires high investment and rapid innovation, patents ap-
pear to be a good incentive to innovate.3 As the importance of doing
business on the Internet grows, the need to protect the software by
patents grows. The novelty and inventive step requirement of patent
law, however, prevents software innovations, which are essentially in-
cremental and cumulative, from patent protection. Moreover, by re-
warding an inventor with strong exclusive property rights, the patent
system impedes the process of follow-on innovation. Copyright pro-
tection for software is convenient because it is automatic. However, it
does not protect program behavior, which can be an important feature
of a computer program's success in the marketplace. Copyright does
not protect the idea or concept in software. It protects only the spe-
cific form where the idea is expressed. Everyone can use the idea.
Trade secrecy cannot protect behavior used in software products, since
such know-how is largely evident in distributed products and trade
secrecy cannot protect what is not secret. It is basically difficult to
keep innovative industrial designs secret once embodied in distributed
products.
These problems with the existing regimes lead us to investigate
possible alternatives to protect computer programs appropriately.
Thus, this study examines the basic structures and features of the al-
ternative systems. Evaluation of the alternative systems through eco-
nomic perspectives on the basis of the characteristics of modern
software development vindicates the idea that the Direct Protection of
Innovation proposed by Kingston and Kronz is the most appropriate
form of protection for computer programs. This study also investigates
main issues that should be considered in introducing the direct protec-
tion system to protect software.
There are four main purposes of this present study. First, it is to
investigate alternative proposals for the protection of computer pro-
grams. Second, it is to find the most appropriate form of protection
for software by evaluating alternative proposals in light of the charac-
teristics of software, software market, and software development.
Third, it is to define the subject matter of the alternative protection
3 In this respect, technological innovations should not be excluded from being patenta-
ble merely because the innovation exists in software.
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systems. Fourth, it is to provide suggestions that should be considered
in order to introduce the new regime at the international level.
This study will suggest a new approach to the issue of protecting
computer programs based on the Direct Protection of Innovation pro-
posed by Kingston and Kronz. Thus, the real novelty of this study
would exist in the application of the Direct Protection of Innovation
to the problems of software protection thrown up by existing regimes.
Another novel aspect of this study can be found in the effort to define
the subject matter of the alternative proposals and evaluate the alter-
natives in light of software development and the defined subject
matter.
This study begins in Chapter II by investigating alternative pro-
posals, which include A Market-Oriented Legal Regime, Compensa-
tory Liability Regimes, Utility Models, Direct Protection of
Innovation and Self-Help Systems. In this chapter, this study tries to
define the subject matter that these alternative proposals are seeking
to protect.
Chapter III evaluates the alternative proposals in light of the eco-
nomic perspectives and the characteristics of modern software devel-
opment, and it tries to find out the most appropriate form of
protection for software at the present day. It should be considered
whether the defined subject matter of each of the alternative propos-
als matches with modern software innovations. According to the eval-
uation revealed in this chapter, the Direct Protection of Innovation
proposed by Kronz and Kingston is the most appropriate form of pro-
tection for software because it solves the most serious problems of the
existing regimes and has many advantages such as familiarity and fea-
sibility. With this conclusion, Chapter IV provides suggestions of how




Software patenting is becoming a global trend. This trend appears
to be accelerating through the rapid growth of the Internet and e-
commerce. If we consider the importance of the features involved in
business methods carried out on the Internet, software patenting is
essential. However, in light of the basic idea of the patent system, it is
necessary to consider whether extending the scope of software patents
will work properly, because overly broad protection will stifle compe-
tition and result in a cost to the public, while narrow protection will
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discourage innovators. 4 If existing legal regimes (i.e. patent, copyright
law, and trade secrecy) do not provide appropriate protection for
software innovations, it is reasonable to consider providing new legal
protection for these small innovations. The new regime should solve
the critical issue of the relationship between the first comer and sec-
ond comer in sequential innovation, i.e. encouraging innovation with-
out impeding follow-on innovations. However, it is desirable that the
new legal regime should be built on existing legal foundation. The new
legal regime would be able to supplement or replace one of the ex-
isting regimes, e.g. the patent system, rather than replacing all of them
by a new one.5
There have been suggested a number of alternative proposals
which include (1) A market-oriented legal regime, 6 (2) Compensatory
liability regimes,7 (3) Utility Models, (4) Direct protection of innova-
tion,8 and (5) Self-help systems. 9 In order to find the most appropriate
form of protection for software, it is necessary to evaluate these alter-
natives in light of the economics of software innovation and the devel-
opment of software.
A. A Market-Oriented Legal Regime
1. Introduction
Considering the fact that the primary purpose of the intellectual
property right (IPR) system is to encourage technological innovation
and the transfer and dissemination of technology,10 a new legal regime
to provide appropriate protection for software should be a market-
based (or market-oriented) one in which innovation and dissemina-
4 See e.g., Koo, supra note 2, at 195-197.
5 This is because the existing regimes have many advantages as well as disadvantages,
and because they have been so widely used that abolishing them might cause more difficult
problems.
6 See generally, Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapor, & J.H.
Reichman, A Manifesto Concerning The Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94
COLUM. L. REV. (1994) [hereinafter A Manifesto]
7 Jerome H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Sub-
patentable Innovation, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: IN-
NOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 23-53 (Rochelle Dreyfuss, Diane L
Zimmerman and Harry First eds., Oxford University Press 2001) [hereinafter
EXPANDING].
8 DIRECT PROTECTION OF INNOVATION (William Kingston ed., Kluwer Academic Pub-
lishers 1987) [hereinafter, DIRECT PROTECTION].
9 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, Self-Helf in the Digital Jungle, EXPANDING, supra note 7,
at 103-122. (encryption, invisible messages, watermark and so on).
10 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Proeprty Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO
Agreement], Annex IC, [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] Part 1, Article 7, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/t-agm0_e.htm (last visited November 16, 2003).
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tion of technology occur naturally. Under the regime, innovations
should build on past innovations, and incentives for innovations today
should not stifle future innovations.
The authors of A Manifesto Concerning The Legal Protection of
Computer Programs," have concluded that while copyright law can
provide appropriate protection for some aspects of computer pro-
grams, other valuable aspects of programs (e.g. the useful behavior
generated when programs are in operation and the industrial design to
produce this behavior) are so vulnerable to rapid imitation that, if left
unchecked, it would undermine incentives to invest in software devel-
opment. 12 The authors of A Manifesto oppose efforts to expand the
boundaries of existing legal regimes to protect these aspects of pro-
grams.13 They suggest that a sui generis approach to legal protection
of computer programs is required. 14 They explain why it is desirable to
take a market-oriented approach to providing legal protection to
these aspects of software.' 5 A market-oriented legal regime, they ex-
plain, needs criteria to assess when market failure is likely to occur.16
They suggest three principal factors to judge the possibility of market
failure from rapid copying: (1) the nature and size of the software en-
tity (or component) that has been imitated; (2) the second comer's
access means to the innovation and the degree of dependence of the
second comer's product; and (3) the degree of similarity between the
first and second products. 17
Market failure is likely if (1) the nature and size of the entity
imitated is substantial, (2) the second comer's development is rapid,
easy and highly dependent on the first comer's product, and (3) the
degree of similarity approaches identicality, and the second comer's
market is proximate to that of the first comer's.' 8
To provide suitable protection for computer programs, which do
not fit neatly within the traditional forms of intellectual property, the
authors of A Manifesto suggest goals and principles for a market-ori-
ented approach.
11 A Manifesto, supra note 6, at 2308.
12 Id. at 2310.
13 Id. at 2311.
14 Id. at 2312.
15 Id. at 2314
16 Id. at 2378.
17 Id. at 2314-15, 2378.
18 Id.
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2. Goals and Principles for a Market-Oriented Approach
According to the authors of A Manifesto, there are goals and
principles, which can be a basis of assessing the best option among
possible legal mechanisms for protecting program know-how. Al-
though any one legal regime cannot achieve all the goals and princi-
ples, it is important to achieve a balance between conflicting
principles, and to satisfy as many principles as possible.
1. Build on existing legal foundations. Because, in some respects,
existing legal regimes appropriately protect software innova-
tions without distortion of their basic principles, a total revi-
sion may be unnecessary. Copyright law, for example, has
provided a simple and effective means of deterring wholesale
copying of source and object code, expressive texts, pictures,
or audiovisual material. Any new legal regime should supple-
ment protection of existing legal regimes.19
3. Focus on the most serious problems. Since no legal regime can
solve all problems and solve them perfectly, the goal should be
focused on a workable solution to the most serious problems in
the software industry.20
4. Provide reasonably predictable scope and duration. A legal re-
gime that protects program behavior and industrial design
should be reasonably predictable as to scope and duration of
protection. This will reduce the potential for litigation.21
5. Be Responsive to the characteristics of software. The regime
should be responsive to the nature of software. The regime
should provide protection of the true sources of value in
software: behavior, the industrial designs that produce behav-
ior, and conceptual metaphors. 22
6. Be technically coherent. The regime should make legal distinc-
tions that are technically coherent.23
7. Evolve naturally. The regime should be able to evolve natu-
rally as the software technology evolves. 24
8. Encourage dissemination. The regime should encourage disclo-
sure and dissemination of program know-how, facilitating im-
provements and new applications. 25
9. Encourage innovation. The regime should encourage useful in-
novation and discourage overheated innovation.2 6
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10. Avoid market failure. The regime should avoid market
failures.2 7
11. Provide reasonable lead-time. The regime should provide rea-
sonable lead-time.2 8
12. Be attuned to the development rate. The regime should be at-
tuned to the rate of development in the market. The rate de-
pends on the state and pace of innovation in the market, and
the relative maturity of the market.29
13. Provide an opportunity to recoup investment. The regime
should provide an opportunity for innovators to recoup their
R&D expenses as far as their work is valuable innovation.30
14. Avoid duplications. The regime should avoid wasteful dupli-
cate effort. 31
15. Share costs. Market participants should share R&D costs in a
competition-enhancing way. A second comer may have a
choice between contributing to the costs of the R&D and re-
fraining from appropriating the innovation for a market-pre-
serving period.32
16. Provide remuneration. A market-oriented legal regime should
recognize the value of an innovation regardless of commercial
success of the product embodying the innovation. Since many
valuable and incremental innovations in software appeared in
commercially unsuccessful products, the regime should find a
way to encourage innovation, independently of whether or not
it is a successful product. 33
17. Provide incentives to agree rather than to litigate. A market-
oriented legal regime should provide incentives to agree rather
than to litigate. To avoid litigation costs as well as high transac-
tion costs of licensing, it is desirable to provide standard licens-
ing arrangements. 34
18. Distinguish among different kinds of second comers. A market-
oriented legal regime should consider a number of factors in
determining whether second comers should pay a standard fee
to use an innovation or should be blocked from use for a pe-
riod of time. Such factors may include the relative size of the
appropriated innovation, the manner by which the taker ac-
cessed it, the degree of similarity, the extent of improvement,
27 Id. at 2407-08.
28 A Manifesto, supra note 6, at 2408.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 2409.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 2409-10.
33 Id. at 2410.
34 Id. at 2411.
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and the proximity between the markets where the innovator
and second comer are operating. 35
19. Be self-executing. The more self-executing a legal regime is, the
more "market-friendly" it will be. A market-oriented legal re-
gime should minimize the costs of obtaining protection. One
way to achieve both market protection and self-execution is to
provide some degree of lead-time protection automatically.
This is especially important in rapidly developing technology
fields, such as software.36 Software developers generally need
legal protection most in the first few years after they have in-
troduced an innovation to the market.37
20. Minimize barriers to entry. A market-oriented legal regime
should minimize barriers to entry. Artificial barriers to entry,
which were intended to cure market failure, may cause another
kind of market failure. 38
21. Promote consumer welfare. A market-oriented legal regime
should promote consumer welfare. The regime should be cau-
tious of both overprotection and underprotection. 39
3. Frameworks for a Market-Oriented Legal Regime
A market-oriented legal regime should pursue the satisfaction of
as many of the principles discussed above as possible.40 An ideal legal
regime may protect just long enough to enable the software innovator
to enjoy the same lead-time as other innovators who contributed
equal value to the market.4' The required amount of artificial lead-
time would depend on the amount of natural lead-time already availa-
ble, in accordance with the difficulty of reverse engineering.42 If such
individualized tailoring were possible, each innovator could count on
the chance of earning the return to justify its investment. 43
a. Automatic Blockage of Cloning:
However, since such individualized tailoring would be unfeasible,
a more plausible approach would be to protect program behavior and
other industrial design elements of a program against cloning for a




38 Id. at 2412.
39 Id. at 2414.




PROTECTION OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS
cloning by law might commence from the first public marketing of the
program embodying it.44
The advantages of this approach are the following: (1) It is low-
cost and self-executing; (2) It would directly protect against the next
most trivial means of acquiring functional equivalence after entire du-
plication of code, identical copying of program compilations and engi-
neering designs; (3) Because it would be limited to protecting against
identical or near-identical copying, it would be relatively predictable;
and (4) After the duration of protection that would be consistent with
lead-time, it would allow compiled know-how to be reused thereafter,
promoting cumulative innovation, competitive add-ons, and the stand-
ardization of efficient solutions.
The disadvantages are the following: (1) It seems too weak, be-
cause substantially similar implementations would not be regarded as
clones; (2) Without a registration system, it may be difficult for second
comers to know when the anti-cloning period expires; and (3) It will
not give any compensation to the innovator whose own commerciali-
zation effort is a failure, though whose innovation is exploited by
others with success and benefits the market.
b. Automatic Anti-Cloning Protection Followed by an Automatic
Royalty-Bearing License:
The disadvantages of automatic blockage of cloning protection
lead us to consider a two-phase protection regime. The first phase
would block clones in order to give innovators the opportunity to de-
velop a market niche. The second phase (automatic license period) 45
would require users to pay standard licensing compensation to the in-
novator. By this second phase, regardless of the commercial success,
the innovator can receive some compensation from others who use his
innovation. The duration of the second period should be short under
the principles discussed above.
However, without a registration system to identify and describe
the subject matter to be protected, it would be difficult to know when
blockage periods ended, when the automatic license period com-
menced, and what was protected. Transaction costs for licenses could
be low, if the law implements a standardized licensing form.
44 Kronz's "Innovation Patent," in DIRECr PROTECrION, supra note 8, at 47 (this is
similar to the direct protection of innovation by Kronz and Kingston. The object of innova-
tion patent by Kronz is the invention actually reduced to practice, and commercialized.
The subject matter of innovation warrant by Kingston is an investment, which turns an idea
into concrete reality).
45 See infra Part II.B., Implications of a Compensatory Liability Regime.
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c. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act 46
Like, Automatic Anti-Cloning Protection with registration, semi-
conductor chip design requires skilled efforts to make incremental im-
provements in the selection and arrangement of functional elements.
As with software, semiconductor chip designs typically bear much of
the incremental technical innovation on the face of the product in the
market. Chips are very costly to develop, but once developed, their
designs are vulnerable to fast and inexpensive appropriations. Second
comers can acquire functional equivalence to an innovative chip de-
sign by copying products in the market. Due to these characteristics,
semiconductor chips, like computer programs, are difficult to fit into
the framework of traditional intellectual property law.
SCPA provides automatic anti-cloning protection to semiconduc-
tor designs from the date of the first commercial distribution of a chip
embodying them.47 This protection lasts for two years unless a chip
developer registers the design at the Copyright Office.48 The SCPA
registration process, like that of copyrights, involves only a light exam-
ination of the application before a registration certificate issues.49 A
timely registration will extend the duration of protection to ten
years.50 The SCPA certificate, like that of copyright registration, con-
stitutes prima facie evidence that the holder has SCPA rights. 51 Under
SCPA, others are free to use aspects of a chip compilation as long as
they design their competing chips independently. 52
SCPA's actual subject matter is "mask works," that is, the set of
stencils or "masks" used in the manufacture of chip layers under the
technology in common use when SCPA was devised.53 A set of "mask
works" for a particular semiconductor chip design must accompany
the application for registration sent to the Copyright Office.54 A regis-
tration system has worked reasonably well for SCPA because mask
works are an intermediate work-product of the manufacturing process
46 Hereinafter SCPA.
47 Kronz's "Innovation Patent," in DIRECT PROTECFION, supra note 8, at 42 (Protecting
from the date of the first commercial distribution appears to be similar to the concept of
Kronz's Innovation Patent system. Protection for a mask work commences on either the
date it is registered with the Copyright Office, or the date on which it is first "commercially
exploited" anywhere in the world, whichever is first.); see 17 U.S.C. § 904(a) (2003).
48 17 U.S.C. § 908(a) (2003).
49 17 U.S.C. § 908(e) (2003).
50 17 U.S.C. §§ 904(b), 908(a) (2003).
51 17 U.S.C. § 908(a) (2003).
52 17 U.S.C. § 908(e) (2003).
53 17 U.S.C. § 902 (2003). See also id. at § 901(a)(2)(2003) (defining "mask work").
54 17 U.S.C. § 908(c) (2003); 37 C.F.R. §211.5 (1993). The choice of mask works as the
subject matter for the SCPA protection regime has been criticized because, as chip technol-
ogy evolves, masks are less frequently used, making SCPA potentially obsolete.
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that can accompany the registration application. Registration of chip
designs also remedies some defects of a pure anti-cloning approach.
For instance, applications for registration must state the date on which
commercial exploitation commenced. This helps copyists determine
when legal protection ceases. Masks deposited at the Copyright Office
also make it easy to know with certainty the exact design protected.
Registration also makes it easier to record transfers of IPRs. 55
However, registration of software innovations would not be easy
to achieve because there is no intermediate design document uni-
formly prepared by software developers. Software developers would
be reluctant to register a design document that disclosed all of the
internal design elements of their programs, and other information that
they can now protect as trade secrets because of the difficulties of
gaining access to it by decompilation. So, SCPA's registration system
would be unworkable as a model for software.56
d. Modified SCPA Approach: Some Automatic Protection Com-
plemented by Registration of Innovative Elements:
This approach provides a period of automatic anti-cloning protec-
tion and an opportunity to register innovative software compilations
or subcompilations in order to acquire a longer period of exclusivity
or a period of compensation under a standard licensing arrangement.
The subject matter of this might include a new user interface design, a
macro language, and a new algorithm. The applicant need not register
the product as a whole, as is required under SCPA. This approach may
best match the design principles.
Registration should probably be required to take place within a
year or two of the first commercial distribution of a product. The legal
regime should employ a copyright-like registration process (rather
than a patent-like examination procedure). It allows later opportuni-
ties to challenge the qualification of the registered material for protec-
tion. This would minimize the costs of gaining protection in the
software industry where the pace of innovation is fast.
Registration might give an extended period of exclusivity or an
automatic royalty-bearing license 57 available on standard terms after
expiration of the unregistered protection right. The latter would re-
move the transaction costs of licensing. Reasonable fixed fees would
encourage second comers to compensate the innovator rather than
duplicating effort. They would also serve the innovator in licensing
negotiations.
55 See 17 U.S.C. § 903(c)(2) (1998).
56 A Manifesto, supra note 6, at 2415-2418 (Section 7.4).
57 See Reichman, EXPANDING, supra note 7, at 39-52 (Reichman's Liability Regime).
Fall 2003)
60 BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:49
e. A Market Segment Approach:
Although exclusive rights regimes do not generally connect the
scope or term with the market proximity of a second corner's prod-
uct, 58 a market-oriented regime for protection of industrial design in
software might do so. A second comer's ability to enter the market
might be regulated according to how close the second corner's market
is to the innovator's market. Some regulation of adjacent markets may
be necessary, because a second comer's exploitation of an innovation
in an adjacent market would have some potential to undermine the
innovator's ability to use the innovation in the adjacent market. How-
ever, if the second corner's market is very distant from the innovator's
market, the second comer's use of the innovation in that market may
not have market-destructive effects and should be regulated lightly.
Derivative uses of an innovation in remote markets might be blocked
for a shorter period of time, or might be subject to an automatic li-
cense rather than a lead-time blocking period.
f An Improvements-Oriented Approach:
An improvements-oriented approach distinguishes those who
made improvements to an innovative program compilation of an-
other's product from those who imitated the compilation without im-
provements. An improver might come to the market sooner than a
copier. Or, the improver might license for a standardized fee, while
the copier would be blocked.
Consideration of improvements would be desirable if a substan-
tial similarity standard (rather than a substantial identity standard)
were selected as the standard by which to judge whether a second
comer had unfairly interfered with the market opportunities of a
software innovator. However, it is often difficult to know whether dif-
ferences from the original are improvements or mere attempts to
avoid liability. Although consumers favor an improved version, this
choice made by consumers does not exactly distinguish between sub-
stantive improvements and price improvements.
4. Alternative Courses of Action
Policymakers have at least three options for legal protection for
software innovations. One is doing nothing. The second option is mak-
ing minimal changes (i.e. Anti-Cloning Protection) to address the ur-
gent underprotection problem: the lack of protection against cloning
58 Trademark laws consider market segment. Goods bearing the name of a first comer's
product are generally regarded as noninfringing of trademark rights if the second corner's
product operates in a market remote from that of the first user.
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program behavior and other industrial design elements of software.
Because a market-oriented legal regime for a fast-moving technology
like computer software should minimize administration, protection
against cloning should start automatically from the first commercial
distribution, and last long enough to give innovators sufficient lead-
time to develop a market niche.
The third option is establishing a registration-based system that
would supplement anti-cloning protection to ensure that innovators
would receive contributions from those who wish to re-implement
their innovations. Since anti-cloning legislation is only a partial solu-
tion, a broader solution would be necessary. It will include a registra-
tion system for innovative compilations of applied know-how
embodied in software. This system would help establish a documented
prior art that could be useful to the development of software engi-
neering. This registration system might also provide incentives for in-
novators to disclose innovative algorithms and other internal design
elements of software, because they can get compensation for the dis-
closed innovations.
It is desirable to devise a legal framework that is adaptable as the
software technology and markets evolve, because the evolution of
technology and markets may affect the legal situation and may open a
number of opportunities for electronic markets.
5. Subject Matter of the Protection
The authors of A Manifesto think that the most important
properties of programs are (1) their behavior, i.e. the set of results
brought about when program instructions are executed, (2) the indus-
trial design responsible for producing behavior, and (3) the conceptual
metaphors that give behavior coherence. 59
The primary source of value in a program is its behavior, not its
text. A really important characteristic of programs is the fact that they
behave. Behavior is an essential part of programs. Program behavior
consists of all the actions that a computer can perform by executing
program instructions. The authors of A Manifesto have tried to pro-
vide a new legal regime for the protection of "the applied know-how
found in the design of program behavior." 60
Conceptual metaphors are valuable as organizing principles for
program behavior, as well as for the virtual worlds and objects they
create. An innovative conceptual metaphor is one of the most valua-
ble types of software innovation. The authors of A Manifesto assert
59 A Manifesto, supra note 6, at 2314.
60 Id. at 2316-2320.
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that the legal regime that protects software should find a way to pro-
tect the effort that produces such valuable new tools as conceptual
metaphors. 61
Computer programs are inherently compilations of sub-compo-
nents. Program construction requires "selection and arrangement of
useful components." Software engineering involves assembling com-
ponents (e.g. data, data structures, and algorithms) to produce a de-
sired behavior. Thus, programs are "compilations of behavioral
components" because larger programs are built from smaller pro-
grams and programs behave. Writing programs is an industrial design
process similar to the design of physical machines. 62
In response to the problems with the existing legal regimes, the
authors of A Manifesto propose a two-part solution: a protection
scheme organized around the source of value in software, i.e. program
behavior and the applied know-how that produces it; and a protection
scheme based in principles of market economics and market
preservation. 63
According to their explanation about the characteristics of (and
the source of value in) computer software, the subject matter that they
have sought to protect by the market-oriented legal regime are the
following:
1. Program behavior, that is, the set of results brought about when
program instructions are executed.
2. The industrial design, which is responsible for producing
behavior.
3. The conceptual metaphors that give behavior coherence and/or
that organize principles for program behavior, virtual worlds,
and objects.
4. Selection and arrangement of useful components. 64
5. Compilations of behavioral components.
6. The applied know-how that produces program behavior.
6. Debates on A Manifesto
Derrick agrees that there are many problems with trying to fit
computer software under current laws. He argues that computer
software is "a different type of animal and it requires a different type
of cage."' 65 After discussing the problems with current copyright and
61 Id. at 2324-2326.
62 Id. at 2326-2330.
63 Id. at 2332-2365.
64 Modern software development has mainly been characterized by the trend of inte-
gration, bundling, componentization and reuse.
65 Douglas C. Derrick, It Doesn't Fit: The Dilemma of Computer Software and Patent!
Copyright Law, E LAW - MURDOCH UNIVERSITY ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF LAW, Vol 3,
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patent laws in protecting computer programs, he introduces the goals
and principles as well as the proposed frameworks for the market-
oriented legal regime of A Manifesto as a solution.
With regard to the failure in providing adequate implementation
details, however, A Manifesto is criticized by Gordon and Goldstein. 66
Even though they are persuaded by A Manifesto and admit that the
law should be amended to protect software behavior, they suggest that
the authors of A Manifesto should provide not just a proposal in itself,
but explain how these principles would work in concrete form.
Arguing that A Manifesto does not provide a detailed sui generis
statute implementing its "market-oriented" solution, and that A Mani-
festo simply provides a long list of goals and principles, Mark Aaron
Paley suggests A Model Software. A Model Software assumes that the
true sources of software value are its algorithms. It differs from A
Manifesto primarily by defining what is protectable. While A Mani-
festo complicates protection by dividing software into five entities, A
Model Software instead uses a much broader definition of the term
"algorithm" which may contain all five of the software behavior enti-
ties, and tries to protect them with a single scheme.67
Ginsburg, one of the opponents of a new legal regime, argues (1)
that the computer industry is currently thriving, (2) that the copyright
does, to some extent, protect "behavior" of computer programs, and
(3) that the alternative proposals are unlikely to achieve domestic en-
actment or broad international agreement. 68 However, Ginsburg's po-
sitions (1) and (2) may be criticized as follow: (1) 'Thriving market'
theory cannot justify the argument that no sui generis regime is neces-
sary, because tomorrow's market could be much better if more appro-
priate regime could be provided today. (2) Copyright cannot protect
the idea or process that is underlined in the sequence of behaviors of
computer programs, since copyright protection cannot "extend to any
idea, procedure, process, system, [or] method of opera-
No 1 (May 1996) at www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v3nl/derrick.html (last visited June
1, 2002).
66 Wendy J. Gordon, Assertive Modesty: An Economics of Intangibles, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 2579 (Dec. 1994); Paul Goldstein, Comments on A Manifesto Concerning the Legal
Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2573 (1994).
67 See generally Mark Aaron Paley, A Model Software,12 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 301. The Five Entities are: Program code, program compilation, subcom-
pilations, algorithms, and features.
68 Jane C. Ginsburg, Four Reasons and a Paradox: The Manifest Superiority of Copy-
right Over Sui Generis Protection of Computer Software, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2559-60
(1994) at www.law.cornell.edu/commentary/intelpro/gns94txt.htm (last visited June 1,
2002).
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tion. . .regardless of the form in which it is embodied. . .in such
work. " 69
B. A Compensatory Liability Regime70
Both patent and copyright protections for software innovations
are unsatisfactory due to the special characteristics of software. While
patents tend to over-protect small innovations in the software indus-
try, copyright provides under-protection resulting in too little incen-
tive to the first comer. To solve this problem, Jerome H. Reichman
proposed a compensatory liability regime.
1. Mechanics of the Compensatory Liability Regime
Reichman explains the compensatory liability regime by a hypo-
thetical 'green tulip' problem. The proposed compensatory liability
scheme obligates second comers to pay equitable compensation for
borrowed improvements over a relatively short period of time. 71 First
comer (Breeder A), who has developed a green tulip, is entitled to a
specified period of artificial lead-time during which the use of the
green tulip requires not authorization but compensation. 72 Breeder
A's entitlement operates as a liability rule and not as an exclusive
property right.73 He does not have the right to deter second comer
(Breeder B), from borrowing his innovation (the green tulip) and
Breeder B need not seek Breeder A's permission to use the innova-
tion in the green tulip as long as Breeder B is willing to pay.7 4
If Breeder B remains patient and waits until the period expires,
he may use the innovation freely.75 An impatient Breeder B who pos-
sesses sufficient technical know-how of his own can develop a green
tulip variety without compensation to Breeder A.76 Breeder C is
treated like Breeder B. 77 Breeder C is also free to use Breeder B's
improved variety (a red, white and green tulip) to his other follow-on
products without seeking authorization. 78 Borrowing the red, white
and green tulip will require compensation to both Breeder A and B (if
it is during the liability period of Breeder A and B). 7 9 If Breeder B
69 17 U.S.C. §102(b) (2003).
70 Reichman, EXPANDING, supra note 7.
71 Id. at 39.






78 Id. at 40-41.
79 Id. at 41.
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and C do not borrow from Breeder A during the liability period, and
accordingly they pay nothing to Breeder A, Breeder A will nonethe-
less have benefited from a period of artificial lead-time. 80
2. Implications of the Compensatory Liability Regime
The compensatory liability regime takes the form of an automatic
license without the power to exclude.81 Despite the weakness of the
right, a right-holder would not necessarily collect less income. An ag-
gressive second comer's applications might yield far more income than
the first comer would have obtained if he had denied the license or
granted it exclusively to a more congenial licensee. The possibility of
unexpected returns arises especially when several second comers be-
come interested in multiple follow-on applications (that could pro-
duce a cumulative benefit in excess of what the first corner's own
business plan might otherwise have yielded). On the contrary, when
Breeder B and C accomplished their own innovations, Breeder A
must contribute to the development costs of Breeder B and C by pay-
ing compensation to them.
Reichman asserts that society would be cumulatively better off
under the regime, while Breeder A is not always worse off and
Breeder B retains sufficient incentives to play the game. Once
Breeder B opts to make contributions to Breeder A's costs, he places
himself in a position to collect similar contributions from Breeder C
and even from Breeder A, who will often want to exploit the second
comer's follow-on innovation in order to keep up with the state of the
art.
Thus, according to Reichman, the proposed compensatory liabil-
ity regime eliminates the economically unjustifiable tendency of exclu-
sive property rights to allocate ownership of follow-on applications
either to the first comer (at the expense of others) or to second com-
ers (at the expense of the initial innovator). 82 In this state, the first
comers can take their business strategies knowing that second comers
must pay compensation for follow-on applications of the small-scale
innovation in which they plan to invest, knowing also that they them-
selves are entitled to borrow back any such follow-on applications in
return for compensatory liability. At the same time, the second
comer's legal ability to borrow freely the first corner's innovation is
limited in practice by the need to consider the profitability of his con-
80 Id.
81 See infra Part II.A.3.b., Automatic Anti-Cloning Protection Followed by an Automatic
Royalty-Bearing License.
82 Reichman, EXPANDING, supra note 7, at 51.
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tribution to the first comer's costs. Within the specified time limits,
this automatic license should empower all the players to move be-
tween the status of lenders and that of borrowers, unimpeded by arti-
ficial legal barriers.
The developments of the Internet and e-commerce have reduced
the cost of copying, shrunk lead-time, and thereby increased the risk
that small-scale innovators will keep their know-how secret. The en-
actment of a general-purpose innovation law on modified liability
principles would lessen these risks, because it would offer innovators a
way to reduce market failure. The liability regime would also provide
some protection for commercially valuable, small-scale innovations,
and thus it would be possible to restrict the dominant patent-copyright
dichotomy to truly non-obvious inventions and original works of au-
thorship. Reichman concludes that the modified liability rule would
resolve the difficulties of property-based rules for small innovations
by providing a designated period of artificial lead-time, during which
firms are permitted to borrow another's sub-patentable innovations
whenever they contribute to the costs of development.83
3. Subject Matter of the Compensatory Liability Regime
How to enable entrepreneurs to appropriate the fruits of their
investments in cumulative and sequential innovation without imped-
ing follow-on innovations and without creating barriers to entry8 4 has
become one of the most difficult issues that law and economics of
IPRs need to address.8 5 Instead of the breakthrough or pioneer inven-
tions of the past, it is the routine engineers' (1) cumulative and se-
quential working out of shared or common technical trajectories that
increasingly drives the post-modern economy.86 The routine engineers
produce technical know-how: i.e. (2) "a store of information about
methods or processes of production, which confers commercial advan-
tages on those who possess it." The production of today's cutting-edge
technical know-how is vulnerable to free-riding duplicators. This vul-
nerability of "small grain-sized innovation" to copiers breeds fears of
market failure.
By suggesting a compensatory liability regime, Reichman seeks to
identify some of the historical difficulties in protecting (3) small grain-
sized innovations that do not rise to the level of novel and non-obvi-
83 Id. at.52.
84 See infra Part II.A.2., Goals and Principles for a Market-Oriented Approach. A mar-
ket-oriented legal regime should minimize barriers to entry.
85 Reichman, EXPANDING, supra note 7, at.23.
86 Id. at 26.
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ous inventions or original and creative works of authorship.8 7 Under
the regime, within a designated period of artificial lead-time, firms are
permitted to borrow one another's (4) sub-patentable innovations,
only if they contribute to the costs of development.
Reichman tries to protect the objects of the following:
1. Cumulative and sequential working out of shared or common
technical trajectories.
2. A store of information about methods or processes of produc-
tion that confers some commercial advantages on those who
possess it.
3. Small-scale innovations that do not rise to the level of novel and
non-obvious inventions or original and creative works of
authorship.
4. Sub-patentable innovations.
According to the above list, the subject matter of the compensa-
tory liability regime can be defined as sub-patentable innovations that
do not rise to the level of novel and non-obvious inventions or original
and creative works of authorship, but can confer commercial advan-
tages on those who possess them.
C. Utility Models
1. Introduction88
The European Commission has presented a proposal for a Direc-
tive approximating the legal arrangements for the protection of inven-
tions by utility model. Though this Directive is aimed at harmonizing
the main provisions of national law regulating the protection of inven-
tions by utility model, this form of protection appears to be more suit-
able for software innovations which have a limited degree of
inventiveness (a lower level of inventiveness than that required for a
patent) and a relatively short life, since it is more flexible and less
burdensome than the patent.89 Utility models are therefore a more
effective tool to SMEs than patents.
87 Id. at 23-24.
88 Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive: approximating the legal
arrangements for the protection of inventions by utility model, 1998 O.J. (C 36) 13
[hereinafter, Proposal for Utility Model], available at http://europa.eu.int/commlinternal-
market/en/indprop/model/utilen.pdf; Amended proposal for a Directive on the protection
of inventions by utility model, Commission of the European Communities, 2000 0.1. (C
248E) [hereinafter, Amended Proposal] available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-
market/en/indprop/model/utilityen.pdf.
89 Proposal for Utility Model, supra note 53.
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2. Mechanics of the Utility Model Regime
"A utility model is a registered industrial property right which
confers exclusive protection for a technical invention." 90 It largely re-
sembles a patent in that the invention must be 'novel', 'inventive' and
capable of industrial application, though generally the level of inven-
tiveness required is not as great as it is in the case of patents. The main
features of the utility model compared with a patent are a lower level
of inventiveness 91 than that required for a patent, the absence of a
prior examination of the protection conditions, and a limited protec-
tion period of no more than ten years.
To distinguish inventions protected by the patent system, it is nec-
essary to define an inventive activity, which constitutes subject matter
of the utility model. According to the proposal, "utility model" means
the registered right, which confers exclusive protection for technical
inventions.
Under the utility model regime, an invention would be consid-
ered as involving an inventive step if it exhibits either particular effec-
tiveness in terms of ease of application, or a practical (or industrial)
advantage. It is required that an invention should not be derived in a
very obvious way from the state of the art. Examples include the fol-
lowing: an invention making it possible to solve a technical problem;
an invention relating to the effectiveness of the use of a product in
that it increases the product's usefulness by making it more effective
and easier to use.
Since the utility model would be granted without prior examina-
tion of the basic conditions, i.e. novelty and inventiveness, it could be
provided rapidly and cheaply, but the protection conferred is less se-
cure. Due to this deficiency of prior examination, in order to reinforce
legal certainty and the rights of third parties, it is required to have a
search report in the event of either legal proceedings to enforce the
rights conferred by the utility model, or extension of the protection
after the initial six-year period.92 The search report is to be drawn up
at the request of either the applicant or third parties.
The suggested period of protection is a maximum of ten years,
comprising an initial period of six years followed by two periods of
two years, where appropriate. The utility model confers on its proprie-
tor the exclusive right to prevent third parties without consent from
making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these pur-
90 Id. at 3.
91 It is, however, very difficult to determine the difference between the levels of inven-
tiveness required for a patent and that for a utility model.
92 Amended Proposal, supra note 53.
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poses the registered product (or the product obtained by the regis-
tered process). The same invention may form the subject matter,
simultaneously or successively, of a patent and a utility model. In or-
der to avoid this duel protection, a utility model (which has been
granted) should be regarded to be ineffective when a patent relating
to the same invention has been granted.
3. Implications of the Utility Model Regime
Quick and simple registration enables the applicant to be pro-
tected within a short period of time against copies and imitations,
thereby consolidating the competitive position of business, in particu-
lar SMEs. Rapid registration gives temporary protection and may lead
to rapid commercialization of the invention.93 It is very useful in coun-
tries where a substantial examination is carried out before a patent is
granted and where the procedure is fairly long.
In the case of legal proceedings or extension of the protection
after the initial six-year period, the requirement of the search report
forces the proprietor to avoid excessive claims for their rights, or to
abandon their unnecessary rights. Through the search report, if the
utility model were recognized as not having novelty or inventive step,
the right is invalidated. Moreover, the right-holders themselves sup-
press their excessive desire to invoke the power of law, because they
are afraid that their right might be invalidated, and because they do
not want to pay any unnecessary fee for the search report.
The lower novelty and inventive step requirements of utility mod-
els provide flexible conditions for obtaining protection for small tech-
nological advances. These flexible conditions encourage companies,
especially SMEs, to apply for utility model protection. Since utility
models are granted without any preliminary examination to establish
novelty and inventive step, they are cheaper to obtain than patents.
From the competitiveness point of view, due to its speed and sim-
plicity, the utility model may help SMEs to improve their market posi-
tion and to facilitate the commercial exploitation of technical
inventions. Business people recognize that they can hold on to a com-
petitive lead only if they can prevent their competitors from copying
or imitating them for a certain period of time through effective protec-
tion measures such as the utility model. They want to show originality
and to distinguish themselves from their competitors, so that custom-
ers develop a positive image of their technological capability. Firms
must constantly improve their products if they are to keep or increase
93 Proposal for Utility Model, supra note 53, at 11-12.
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market shares. SMEs, unlike large firms, must step up their inventive
activities if they are to face up to the stiffer competition.94
Utility model protection is appropriate for small technological
advances with a relatively short lifetime, which are likely to develop in
future. In this respect, utility model can be useful to SMEs, which ac-
count for more than 99% of all European firms, 66% of all jobs and
65% of turnover in the European Community. 95 Z.A. Silberston sug-
gests that the introduction of a wider adoption of petty patents (utility
models) would be the most likely to occur in the foreseeable future.96
On the other hand, according to a study carried out by ESRC,
Intellectual Property and the Small and Medium Enterprise,97 SMEs
"preferred informal protection methods which were perceived as
cheaper, more familiar and, for the most part, successful. ' '98 In con-
trast, they viewed formal legal rights, particularly those requiring re-
gistration, as "expensive, time-consuming, complex and of limited
value." 99 "Registered rights were less commonly reported than other
legal methods of protection."100 The results of the study show that
SMEs "tend to use formal rights only in very specific circumstances"
e.g. where high commercial benefits are expected; where SMEs "be-
lieve formal rights are likely to offer better protection than informal
methods;" and where SMEs "possess the necessary resources and the
desire to acquire, maintain and enforce formal rights." 101 Moreover,
most SMEs "reported no intention to pursue legal action.. .even when
success was anticipated. ' 10 2 "The costs associated with taking legal ac-
tion" (money, time, difficulty of establishing infringement and risk to
the reputation of the business) "were felt to be prohibitive.' 1 3 Most
SMEs wanted to "allocate resources to product and process innova-
tion, rather than acquiring and enforcing formal IPRs."'10 4 Thus, utility
94 Id. at 18.
95 According to the study carried out by ESRC, Intellectual Property and the Small and
Medium Enterprise, 96.7% of all businesses in the UK have turnovers of under £1million
available at http://info.sm.umist.ac.uk/esrcip/Projects/15253004.htm (last visited December
13, 2003).
96 Z.A. Silberston, supra note 8, at 213.
97 Intellectual Property and the Small and Medium Enterprise: Based Upon the Final
Report to the ESRC, available at http://info.sm.umist.ac.uk/esrcip/Projects/L5253004/final_
report.htm (last visited October 8, 2001).
98 See id. Formal protection practices involve "the creation of legal rights and sanctions
for their infringement." Informal practices "attempt to restrict the possibility of having to
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model regimes, which require registration, may be less appropriate
than informal methods to SMEs.
4. Subject Matter of the Utility Models
According to the utility model laws of Japan, the subject matter
of the protection in the utility model system can be defined as indus-
trially applicable devices relating to the shape, construction or a com-
bination of articles, which are the creation of technical ideas by which
a natural law is utilized.10 5 Devices falling into the category of meth-
ods, devices of constituents and devices of chemical substances, arti-
cles not having a certain shape, animal species, and plant species are
excluded from the registration of utility model. 106
Computer programs, which do not have a certain shape, appear
to be excluded from the subject matter of utility model.107 However,
the abandonment of preliminary examination to establish novelty or
inventiveness, which results in simplicity and low cost, is worth consid-
ering for the protection of small technological advances with a rela-
tively short lifetime such as computer programs.
D. Direct Protection of Innovation
1. Introduction
All the early grants of monopolies in exchange for doing some-
thing new were grants of patents for innovation, not for invention. 108
In exchange for sole rights, the patentee introduced a manufacture,
which was new to the country.
Patents granted today relate only to information, not to the infor-
mation which is embodied. The means of instructing the public about
the new has been replaced by a description on paper, the patent speci-
fication. Since any protection by a patent to innovation is now re-
moved, how much protection an innovation receives depends upon
the distance between the idea (of invention) and its realization. 109 If
the idea is capable of only one unique embodiment, indirect protec-
tion is as good as direct protection. If it can be embodied in several
ways, however, the link between invention and innovation becomes
weak, and indirect protection of the innovation becomes worthless.
105 JAPAN UTILITY MODEL LAW, Law No. 123 of 1959 as amended by Law No. 220 of
1999, Ch. II, no. 3-1.
106 JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE, Part 10: Utility Model: Chapter 2. Basic Requirements
for Utility Model Registration, in Examination Guidelines for Patent and Utility Model in
JAPAN 301(2)(i) (1993).
107 Id.
108 Kingston, supra note 8, at 2.
109 Id. at 3.
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In these ways, the patent system has become less effective in pro-
tecting innovation. Moreover, the inventive step requirement of the
patent system made it difficult for incremental innovation to be pro-
tected. The inventive step requirement effectively removed much in-
cremental innovation from the scope of patent protection. The
characteristics of this type of innovation are that once it has been
done, reconstructing it from elements of prior art is very easy. Since
incremental innovation emerges naturally and logically from what has
been done before, it is particularly vulnerable to the patent examiner's
typical examination of inventive step. Thus, adoption of the inventive
step criterion meant the abandonment of patent protection for many
incremental innovations.
Hermann Kronz and William Kingston have tried to extend the
exploitation of the principle of patenting by reviving the direct protec-
tion of innovation. According to them, direct protection of innovation
has many advantages; it may give protection to incremental innova-
tions; it offers different protection for investment of different risks; 110
it provides secure protection to SMEs;111 it makes innovation more
profitable; and it generates great increase in investment.112 On this
ground, they proposed 'innovation patent' and 'innovation warrant',
respectively.
2. Kronz's Innovation Patent
In the Kronz system, a concept or technical teaching is not pro-
tected. A concept can be protected through every possible individual
embodiment of the concept. While the patent system gives a reward
for ideas, an innovation patent gives a reward for turning ideas into
concrete realities, i.e. for innovative action. Kronz argues that since an
innovation patent refers directly to the innovative object, it offers bet-
ter protection of the risky investment and must be an improved means
of promoting innovation. After finding many drawbacks in the ex-
isting patent system, Kronz became convinced that it is necessary to
re-establish the original doctrine of patent protection.
a. Features of Innovation Patent:
The following are the main features of the Kronz proposals:1 13
1. The object of protection is not an invention but an innovation,
i.e. the invention actually reduced to practice, and
commercialized.
110 Id. at.92.
111 Id. at 99-100.
112 Id. at 95.
113 Id. at 36.
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2. Anything, which can be embodied in marketable new things,
can be protected, not just technology.
3. Processes can be protected not directly, but through the physi-
cal components involved in them.
4. Capacity to commercialize an innovation as well as technical
capacity to realize it is a condition for receiving protection. If
either is lacking, it can be provided with a "substitute innova-
tor" through contractual arrangements.
5. Protection grants a monopoly to make, use and sell the innova-
tion for a prescribed period, in the same form as in the classical
patent system.
6. The territorial extent of protection can be a country, a region
of a country, or a group of countries by agreement.
7. The protection period would vary from case to case. It depends
on the innovating firm, the market and the project.
8. Protection does not apply to the diffusion phase, just as it does
not apply to the invention phase.
9. The scope of protection is defined by claims.
10. Novelty is destroyed only by "public prior use", which is estab-
lished by first commercial use. It would relate only to the avail-
ability of the actual commercial embodiment to the public.
Novelty is not influenced by the accessibility to any concepts
or technical teaching, as long as the embodiment of the con-
cepts or technical teaching does not exist in a fully commercial
context.
11. The system would either replace or supplement the classical
patent system.
12. Grants are incontestable unless the application involves fraud.
13. There is no obligation to continue use after the first act of
commercialization, but this can result in substantial loss of
rights.
b. The Subject Matter of Innovation Protection:114
In the Kronz system, what can be protected is an artifact whose
use is new within the jurisdiction in its commercial form. Originations
of a concept, discovery, design, models or prototypes do not qualify
for the protection. Innovation patent is granted only to the combina-
tion of a tangible object and the initial act of commercializing it. If an
innovation patent is granted, the object of innovation should be in the
stage ready for commercialization. The only question is whether or
not the object has been brought into public use for the first time in the
jurisdiction by the applicant.' 15
114 Id. at 37.
115 Herman Kronz, Response in Defense of the Innovation Patent Concept, in DIRECT
PROTECTION, supra note 8, at 262, 268.
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Innovation patents protect entire articles, whether they contain
many different "inventions" or other concepts. The entity to be pro-
tected is the article (product or process) as offered for sale or other
commercial use. The principle of "unity of invention" in the classical
patent system is replaced by the "unity of the goods".
The Kronz system grants protection to many incremental innova-
tions, which could not be protected by classical patent system due to
their lacking an "inventive step". Such cases might include transposi-
tion, application, identification, formulation, selection, simplification,
combination and aggregation.
The protection by the Kronz system extends beyond the individ-
ual object that is actually sold in two ways: Firstly, copying it merely
by substituting "technical equivalents" is banned. Simply changing
components, material, scale, form, proportions or arrangements for
embodying the innovation would be within the scope of an innovation
patent. Secondly, the patentee is allowed to list variants of his innova-
tion other than the one he has actually used in the market. The protec-
tion he will receive for these will not be as good as for the one he has
actually adopted. Others will be allowed to make and market them if
they pay a royalty.116 Thus, the obligation to commercialize in the
Kronz system forces an innovator to select out of all possible variants
of his ideas to turn into concrete reality, the one which will best meet
the market's needs. 117
On the other hand, the "initial commercial act" would be defined
by statute. It might include sales promotion, showing at exhibitions,
commissioning plant with a view to production, supply to distributors
and offer to sell. Internal use, which takes place within a commercial
firm, qualifies because this is considered to have consequences in the
commercial world outside. 118 Using within a public research labora-
tory, however, would not qualify for protection.
Direct protection by the innovation patent is similar to copy-
right.119 In copyright, protection is not given to any idea or concept for
the work, which an author or an artist might have in mind. Copyright
protects the work itself. There is nothing in the copyright system that
can be compared with "the inventive step" or "novelty" criteria of the
patent system. 120 The important thing is whether or not something
concrete has been produced through original effort.
116 See supra Part II.B.
117 Kingston, supra note 8, at 39.
118 Id. at 40.
119 Id. at 39.
120 See supra Part II.C.4 (there is no preliminary examination to establish novelty and
inventiveness in utility model system).
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Since only tangible objects can receive innovation protection, a
process as such, which is not a tangible object, cannot qualify. In the
Kronz system, this results in protection of a process through its com-
ponents. A listing of both the hardware and the software involved in a
process results in a description of the process. In a process, the inno-
vative act only takes place when the process works. 121
A similar approach allows innovation protection to cover com-
puter programs and methods of doing business. 122 According to this
system, a description of a method of doing business may consist of
both the hardware and the software involved in the method of doing
business. According to Kronz's explanation, a process controlled by
computer programs can be described as an aggregate of tangible ob-
jects, interacting together. In the case of a chemical process, the appa-
ratus used would be described, as well as the substances that are used
in the apparatus. The "settings", "readings" or "timings" of all the
interacting components of the apparatus as well as their mode of in-
teracting, and the inputs and outputs of the operation would be given
in terms of energy and materials. 23
c. Filing and Novelty:
When an applicant can supply the proof to the Office that an ini-
tial act of commercialization of the technical innovation object has
taken place, he can apply for a provisional grant of protection.124 This
will be granted immediately if he can supply a declaration by a compe-
tent authority that the subject matter is indeed novel, in the sense of
"not being already commercially available". 125
The Office will then publish the specification so that any inter-
ested third party may oppose the provisional grant. Since grant is ir-
revocable, unless it has been obtained through fraud, third parties are
expected to submit the necessary information. The innovation patent
office carries out its own independent examination.
In the classical patent system, a single document on its own can
defeat a claim to novelty. In the Kronz system, such a document car-
ries no influence at all since protection is not being given for a techni-
cal teaching, but for embodiments of teaching. A document will carry
influence in the examination to the extent that it provides evidence of
prior reduction to practice of the concept or teaching together with its
121 Kronz, supra note 8, at 263.
122 Kingston, supra note 8, at 40.
123 Id. at 41.
124 Id. at 47.
125 WILLIAM KINGSTON, INNOVATION, CREATIVITY AND LAW, 168 (1990).
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actual use in public.126 "New" does not refer to the teaching, but to
the "act". This "act" (object, product or process) must be new within
the jurisdiction. In the innovation patent system, "novelty" is based
exclusively on "domestic public prior use" of a product or process
available commercially. 2 7 The innovation patent is granted to the first
innovator (doer) not to the first inventor (thinker). 28
d. Claims:
To define the scopes of the grant, Kronz uses "copy" or "option"
claims.1 29 "Copy" claim covers the innovation object in its precise con-
crete details, successively itemizing its elements, features and compo-
nents, in a similar manner to "Jepson-type" claim. 130 The protection
defined by a "copy" claim extends to technical equivalents, as in class-
ical patents. Option claims cover alternative variants of the actual in-
novation object which has been the subject of the "first commercial
act". The content of an option claim as such cannot be cited against
the novelty of another innovation patent application. It becomes ef-
fective only after it has been embodied.
e. Scope of Protection and Infringement:131
The copy claim is single claim covering the innovation object. Op-
tion claims will have weaker legal force than the copy claim. Licenses,
if requested, cannot be refused.
Since innovation protection is granted for the combination of the
innovation object with its commercialization, any act of infringement
of the protection must contain both of these elements. Mere manufac-
ture of all the parts that would constitute an object, which belongs to
innovation patent, does not constitute full infringement. And the act
of simply selling the innovation object would not. These are acts of
indirect infringement. Only when both types of infringement are com-
bined, there can be an act of full infringement.
126 Kingston, supra note 8, at 48.
127 Kronz, supra note 8, at 269 (Kronz admits that proving "prior public use" is more
difficult than proving prior publication of the idea in the literature).
128 Id. at 260.
129 Kingston, DIRECT PROTECTION, supra note 8, at 49.
130 See generally Jeffrey G. Sheldon, How TO WRITE A PATENT APPLICATION, Practising
Law Institute, November 1996 (Jepson-type claims are used to claim inventions that consist
of improvements over existing articles, processes, or compositions of matter. After the
description of a preamble that broadly describes all the conventional or known elements of
the combination claimed, a description of the novel and non-obvious elements that consti-
tute the new and improved portion of the claimed combination follows).
131 35 U.S.C.§271(a) (2003) (the definition of infringement in the patent statute encom-
passes making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing a patented process or product).
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Kronz thinks that an innovation patent is weaker than a classical
patent in that it has only a reduced scope of protection. It protects
against copying, including copying by the use of "technical
equivalents". 132 An innovation patent also protects "optional" con-
cepts disclosed by the patentee before the grant of the patent. Option
claims do not deter their subject matter to be used by third parties,
since the claims have the obligation to grant a license. The main pur-
pose of option claims is to deal with the problem of infringement in
cases where the supposedly infringing embodiment of the object of
innovation is not a "technical" equivalent, but a "conceptual" one. In
the innovation patent, the question of infringement can only arise
when the subject matter of the option claims is used without license.
However, since granting a license is obligatory, there should be very
little litigation.
Kronz regards his system as being capable of supplementing or
replacing the classical patent system. He thinks replacement as bring-
ing the patent system back to its original value. Kronz accepts that if
the patent is actually exploited, the innovation protection is not
necessary.
3. Kingston's Innovation Warrant
Like Kronz, Kingston as well has made the proposals for direct
protection of innovation. Direct protection of innovation by warrants
is achieved by making the subject matter an investment that turns an
idea into concrete reality. Warrants protect the investment, which is
concerned with getting new things done, where new information is
generated. In fact, anything new can be protected, as long as it can be
the subject of investment, which means anything that can be bought
and sold.
a. Subject Matter and Novelty Criterion:
In the warrant system, the subject matter of warrant protection is
not an idea, but investment to turn an idea into concrete reality. New
goods or services can be protected by the system, as long as it can be
the subject of investment. If the subject matter of the warrant applica-
tion is not available for purchase now in the ordinary course of trade,
an investment to make it available is entitled to the protection of a
warrant. 133 Anything that can be bought and sold comes within the
scope of the system, which extends far beyond technology. This means
that computer software and methods of doing business can be pro-
132 Kronz, DIRECT PROTECTION, supra note 8, at 261.
133 Kingston, DIRECT PROTECTION, supra note 8, at 63.
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tected. 134 The criteria would be newness and the purchasability of the
things for money. An important feature of Kingston's scheme is his
emphasis on the national market. A product to be protected should be
available in ordinary course of trade for the first time, and that means
that it should be available through investment for production in the
national market. (Imports would not satisfy the condition for the inno-
vation warrant, while they would for Kronz.) 135
Since the warrant system eliminates the argument of the "inven-
tive step", it fits well with incremental innovations, such as computer
software. For example, if a product with a particular new feature is not
available in the ordinary course of trade and a product of a general
type is available, an investment to bring the product with the new fea-
ture on the market is entitled to a warrant.
b. Features:
The main features of the warrant system are "public enforce-
ment", incontestability and risk consideration. The innovation office
renders the enforcement of the warrant. This makes the quality of the
monopoly completely independent of the warrant holder. There is
particular logic to this approach. Since a warrant is granted by the
state in order to encourage innovative investment, an attempt to in-
fringe a warrant is regarded not just an act that damages the rights of
a warrant-holder, but also an attack on the economic policy of the
state. The innovation office itself can prosecute infringers on behalf of
the warrant-holder. 136 Kingston asserts that, considering the impor-
tance of a firm's investment that is at high risk in the generation of
new information embodied in its product, the firm's asset arising from
its efforts at innovation should be protected by the state, as in other
types of property, e.g. money or buildings.
The warrant grant is incontestable unless obtained by fraud, as in
the Kronz system. Therefore, once a grant is made after opposition
proceedings investment can be based upon it with complete confi-
dence. Incontestability combined with freedom from litigation would
make a warrant attractive for investment opportunities.
The term for the monopoly is determined by the consideration of
the risk undertaken in an innovatory investment. 137 The length of the
monopoly period is considered to match the reward to the risk in an
investment. Kingston thinks that the more perfect the protection is,
the shorter warrant terms can be.
134 Silberston, DIRECT PROTEcrION, supra note 8, at 203.
135 Id. at 203-204.
136 Kingston, supra note 8, at 66.
137 Id. at 62.
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c. Procedure:38
A firm that wants to acquire an innovation warrant submits a pro-
posal for investment to bring something new on the market, to the
innovation office. The innovation may be a new product, or a product
already on the market, but with some new features. The application
should specify the amount of investment estimated to be required to
carry out the innovation.
The office carries out an initial screening process to eliminate ap-
plications, which are already on the market. There can be a right of
appeal to the courts for the office's rejection. When the office's
screening shows that the proposal is prima facie new to the market, its
technical details are published, and a period is allowed for third party
objections. Since a warrant is incontestable unless obtained by fraud,
monitoring of such publication is very important to all firms.
After the opposition proceedings, if there is no ground for rejec-
tion, the office calculates both project-related and firm-related risks,
and offers an option on a warrant for the appropriate term to the ap-
plicant. 139 When the innovation office offers a warrant to the appli-
cant, some period of time (option period) is allowed for the applicant
to make his detailed plan, arrange financing, and reach a final decision
as to whether or not to make the necessary investment. The period
may be related to the length of term of the offered warrant. It is ex-
pected that decisions as to radical advances and decisions involving
more resources of a firm will take longer than incremental
innovations.
The continuance of a warrant in force is conditional on making an
investment to carry through the innovation, and this is time-bound.
The investment should be completed within a certain portion of the
term, if the warrant is not to be nullified. 140 Stricter conditions would
be given to the investment in incremental innovation and relaxed ones
for a radical innovation.
d. Infringement:
Kingston explains that "infringement" means "attempting to di-
minish the value of an innovation warrant, other than by innova-
tion."'1 41 To ensure the effectiveness of warrant-holder's monopoly,
Kingston suggests that it is necessary to develop a new doctrine of
"commercial equivalence". This doctrine requires looking beyond the
doctrine of technical equivalence that applies in the patent system.
138 Id. at 76.
139 Id. at 77.
140 Id. at 78.
141 Id. at 74.
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This is because there are many ways where a competitor might dimin-
ish a warrant-holder's possibility of recouping investment, other than
by producing a product, which is technically equivalent.
To protect warrant-holders, the innovation office should take ac-
tion against competitors producing "commercially equivalent" prod-
ucts. 14 2 A different innovation which itself obtained a warrant will not
be attacked under this procedure. However, a new warrant-holder
may have to pay a royalty to an earlier warrant-holder, if his innova-
tion is based upon the earlier one.
4. Implications of Protecting Innovation Directly143
The two proposals, the innovation patent by Kronz and the inno-
vation warrant by Kingston, were developed independently of each
other.144 They, however, have the following common features:
1. The subject matter of protection should be innovation, not
invention.
2. Any economic object, including technology, can be protected.
3. The criterion of novelty should be actual commercial
availability.
4. The term of grant should be variable.
5. Grants should be incontestable unless obtained by fraud.
6. Terms of grant may differ between regions of a country.
7. Examination relies heavily on a third party.
8. The system can be administered by an independent authority.
Their main differences are the following:
1. The innovation patent requires that an innovation object should
exist before protection is given. This means that the associated
investment should be made first. The innovation warrant offers
protection before investment is made. Actual investment is the
condition of keeping the monopoly in force.
2. The innovation patent system tries to match the length of mo-
nopoly to the individual innovative capacity of the patentee.
However, the innovations warrant system seeks to eliminate of-
ficial discretion and makes a set of terms, which may not corre-
spond to the innovative capacity (exactly) in each case.
3. The innovation patent office prescribes licensing terms that con-
sider the innovative capacity of the licensee. The innovation
warrants have no similar provisions.
4. While the patentee of an innovation patent should protect his
own right, in the warrant system the state should protect the
warrants it makes.
142 Silberston, supra note 8, at 205.
143 Kingston, supra note 8, at 87.
144 Kingston argues that they were developed completely independently of each other.
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5. The scope of protection is determined by "technical
equivalents" in the Kronz system, and "commercial
equivalents" in the Kingston system, respectively. The doctrine
of "commercial equivalence" extends beyond "technical
equivalence".
a. Incremental Innovation:
Incremental innovation is most likely to be achieved in the small
firm.145 Incremental innovations are mostly the improvements to
products or processes, which are individually small, but cumulatively
of supreme economic importance. 146 They may be obvious to one
skilled in the art, and therefore unpatentable under the present patent
system.
Kingston asserts that direct protection for many incremental in-
novations can be achieved by the two proposals. The classical patent
requires that an invention should have an inventive step and it should
not be obvious to one skilled in the art. It is indeed true that the ma-
jority of patents are for small "improvements". 147 The countless small
changes in a product are those, which are underlying in the preceding
technology, and grow naturally out of it. This "natural" or "evolution-
ary" growth makes them obvious and unpatentable. This means that
the patent system does not protect investment in incremental innova-
tion. By giving up the "inventive step" criterion, Kingston maintains,
incremental innovations can be effectively protected. Kronz as well
argues that the abandonment of the inventive step criterion is substan-
tially what the innovation patent system proposes. 148 Considering the
fact that "modifications" of something which already exist can obtain
an innovation patent if it is neither a "technical equivalent" nor an
object of an option claim of the initial innovation patent, innovation
patents will be much the same as utility model in number and level.149
In the case of a second innovator who has brought an incremental
change to a protected product, protection will be granted to the sec-
ond innovator for the incremental change, but the grant will be en-
dorsed with the requirement that the innovation cannot be put into
practical effect without infringing the first innovator's right, since it
will use some of the information generated by the first innovation.150
145 Kingston, DIRECT PROTECrION, supra note 8, at 107.
146 WILLIAM KINGSTON, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INNOVATION, at 211.
147 Kingston, supra note 125, at 173.
148 Kronz, supra note 8, at 267.
149 Kronz, DIRECT PROTECTION, supra note 8, at 270, 271. (The lower novelty and in-
ventive step requirement of utility models provide protection for small technological
advances).
150 Kingston, DIRECT PROTECTION, supra note 8, at 313.
Fall 20031
82 BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:49
The use of the incremental improvement will depend on agreement
between the two parties. The first innovator will naturally want the
incremental improvement to be incorporated in his product as soon as
possible. Agreements can be reached to allow the first innovator to
collaborate with the second innovator, which would allow both inno-
vators to benefit. One option could take the form of a royalty or an-
other arrangement. The second innovator may have another choice.
He can wait until the first innovator's monopoly is expired. 151 Then he
will be free to use the first innovation with his own improvement in-
corporated in it.
b. Know-How:
Direct protection may also stimulate technology transfer by pro-
viding protection of know-how. 152 The existing patent system is sup-
posed to do this, but in reality fails to do so. For example, studies of
license agreements show that an important thing is know-how, not
what is disclosed in the patent specification. A reason why "know-
how" is lacking in the patent specification is that the inventive step
criterion does not permit the protection of a craftsman's practical
knowledge. 153 If know-how receives no protection under the present
patent system, no applicant will want to disclose it. However, because
both the innovation patent and warrant give protection to know-how,
there is no reason why applicants would be unwilling to make these
disclosures in exchange for protection.
c. Infringement and Litigation:
To determine whether or not an object belongs to the scope of
the protection of an innovation patent or an innovation warrant, it is
necessary to decide whether the object is a "technical equivalence" or
a "commercial equivalence". The scope of "commercial equivalence"
is much wider than that of "technical equivalence" and very difficult
to determine. It includes the consideration of the time and the market,
which the product belongs to. Even though an object is not a technical
equivalent, it can be a commercial equivalent. In this respect, there
could be many disputes. Moreover, "commercial equivalence" may
change depending on time. As time goes by, an object, which consti-
tuted infringement before, may no longer be a "commercial
equivalent", as the market changes.
151 Id. at 313; see also supra Part II.B.
152 Kingston, supra note 125, at 175.
153 Kronz, supra note 8, at 267.
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Claims in innovation patent are unlikely to cause litigation. 154 In-
fringement of a copy claim will be a very unusual event, because such
a claim covers the actual embodiment marketed by the patentee, with
protection extending to technical equivalents only. A competitor can
follow by "innovating around" a copy claim by changing the product
in the ways that are not technically equivalent. Alternatively, a com-
petitor can seek a license under one of the option claims. The option
claims cover alternatives, which have been considered and tested by
the innovator. A license to use the alternatives covered by option
claims must be granted, if requested. In this respect, the two proposals
are similar to the Liability Regime proposed by Reichman. Thus, in-
fringement may be regarded as an unimportant feature for the innova-
tion patent regime. On the contrary, infringement is very important
for the innovation warrant.
Moreover, the innovations warrant proposals lift the burden of
enforcing the monopoly grant from the warrant-holders. The typical
problem of litigation is that it takes too much economic resources. If
the warrant-holder cannot enforce without going to courts, and if he
has no resources to do this, the protection is actually worthless. This is
why the warrant proposals make the enforcement the responsibility of
the granting authority. By contrast, in the innovation patent, enforce-
ment remains the patentee's own responsibility and infringement will
be pursued through the courts in the same way as in the case of classi-
cal patents.
d. Comments on Subject Matter of the Direct Protection:
It is much better to give protection to an existing object or pro-
cess that is new, than to the idea which can often be embodied in
various ways. This is because ideas can be embodied in diverse eco-
nomic objects, and they can be easily litigated. 155
To give protection beyond technological products or processes
may include the field of fashion, designs, organizations, sales methods,
services (computer programs, information systems, management prac-
tices, etc) and the like. Thus, the innovation protection covers com-
puter programs and methods of doing business.
Considering the importance of incremental innovations, espe-
cially in the fields of computer software, abandonment of the non-
obviousness criterion in the innovation protection may be helpful for
the protection of innovations of computer software. 156
154 Kingston, supra note 8, at 325.
155 Henk Wouter de Jong, supra note 8, at 225.
156 In the innovation patent system the criterion of inventive step is no longer applied.
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E. Self-Help Systems:
"Self-help" refers to an expanding set of technologies and sys-
tems designed to protect content from unauthorized copying and to
facilitate e-commerce involving content. 157 The author of Self-help in
the Digital Jungle uses "content" broadly to include "text, data,
images, audio, video, and all of the other media that patrons of the
Web are familiar with. ' 158 He uses the concept of a "content" in the
broadest possible sense to include all forms of information and with-
out distinction as to whether or not the information is legally pro-
tected against access by unintended recipients through intellectual
property rights. 159
Dam asserts that self-help systems will not only reduce the inci-
dence of copyright violations, but will also be one of the crucial suc-
cess factors in e-commerce. He maintains that because the systems can
protect uncopyrightable or uncopyrighted materials as well as copy-
righted materials, they should not be viewed as conflicting with the
intellectual property law of copyright.
Self-help systems enable a content provider to transmit content to
a potential reader by posting it on a website, e-mailing it, etc. while
preventing anyone from accessing it without permission. The systems
can facilitate implementation of many of the ideas underlying pro-
competitive and fair use ideas embedded in intellectual property
law.160 Self-help systems can harness the characteristics of digital cop-
ies that are normally identical with one another. The technology of
self-help systems lowers transactions costs and thereby reduces unde-
sirable social behavior (such as free riding appropriation of content
created by others). As transaction costs go down (and convenience
goes up), it is easier for people to do the right thing (that is, paying or
obtaining permission).
According to the research sponsored by the UK Economic and
Social Research Council, under the £1.2 million program Intellectual
Property Initiative, SMEs relied generally on copyright for their
software.16' 100% of the firms interviewed resorted to copyrights as
157 Kenneth W. Dam, Self-Help in the Digital Jungle, in EXPANDING, supra note 7, at
103, 104.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 107.
160 Id. at 110.
161 Dr. Puay Tang, John Adams, & Dr. Daniel Pard, Patent Protection of Computer
Programmes: Final Report, Submitted to European Commission, Directorate-General En-
terprise (2001) p. 18 (their general reliance on copyright appears to be based on the charac-
teristic of copyright, i.e. automatic protection unnecessary for formal registration) available
at http://swpat.ffii.org/papers/tangadpa00/tangadpa00.pdf (last visited October 16, 2001)
[hereinafter Adams & Tang].
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their main mode of protection because it is cheap and automatic. They
also employed several informal methods of protection, particularly
technical systems, such as encryption, 162 dongles, 163 steganographic
techniques, 64 key diskettes, a65 firewalls 166 and passwords. 167 More
than half of the respondents used these systems. The research shows
that, while only a minority of SMEs patent their software creation, the
majority of them regard copyright, technical systems of protection,
and licensing as the most common methods of protection.1 68 The sur-
vey data on how SMEs rank the importance of methods of intellectual
property protection reveals that 27% of SMEs ranked licensing as the
most important means of protection; 24% of them regarded technical
systems of protections as the most important; and 21%, copyright. It is
interesting to note that 52% of those interviewed considered market
niche and technical systems of protection as important methods of
protection. 169
Contrary to the wide use of technical methods (self-help systems
against circumvention), several respondents, even though they were
using the technical methods, acknowledged that such systems are gen-
162 Definition available at http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/glossary/
0,294242,sidl4,00.html (last visited October 16, 2001). Encryption is the conversion of data
into a form, called a ciphertext, that cannot be easily understood by unauthorized people.
Decryption is the process of converting encrypted data back into its original form, so it can
be understood.
163 Definition available at http://www.computerlanguage.com/sitemain/content.html
(last visited October 16, 2001). Dongle is the same as hardware key. Hardware key: Also
called a "dongle," it is a copy protection device supplied with software that plugs into a
port (parallel, serial, USB, etc.) on a PC. The software sends a code to that port, and the
key responds by reading out its serial number, which verifies its presence to the program.
The key hinders software duplication, because each copy of the program is tied to a unique
number, which is difficult to obtain, and the key has to be programmed with that number.
164 Steganography: Hiding a message within an image, audio or video file. Used as an
alternate to encryption, it takes advantage of unused bits within the file structure or bits
that are mostly undetectable if altered. A steganographic message rides secretly to its desti-
nation, unlike encrypted messages, which although undecipherable without the decryption
key, can be identified as encrypted. For a white paper on the subject written by Neil F.
Johnson of George Mason University, visit www.jjtc.com/Steganography.
165 Definition available at http://www.computerlanguage.com/sitemain/content.html
(last visited October 16, 2001). Key: In cryptography, a numeric code that is combined in
some manner with the text to encrypt it for security purposes.
166 Firewall: A method for keeping a network secure from intruders. It can be a single
router that filters out unwanted packets or may comprise a combination of routers and
servers each performing some type of firewall processing. Firewalls are widely used to give
users secure access to the Internet as well as to separate a company's public Web server
from its internal network. Firewalls are also used to keep internal network segments se-
cure; for example, the accounting network might be vulnerable to snooping from within
the enterprise.
167 Adams and Tang, supra note 117, at vi-vii, 19.
168 Id. at viii, 58.
169 Id. at 19.
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erally very user unfriendly, and very complicated. Those who did not
employ these methods explained the reason that the lack of an indus-
try standard made them cautious about employing them.170 Other re-
spondents regarded the push for technical protection as a conspiracy
by large companies to protect their territories from more innovative
and imaginative smaller companies. Similarly, the Legal Advisory
Board (of the European Commission) stated that the widespread use
of technical protection devices might result in the de facto creation of
new information monopolies. These views appear to emphasize the
necessity to protect fair use rights.
1. Types of self-help systems
a. Encryption:
Encryption is the basic technology of self-help systems. The en-
crypted content is placed within a digital envelope so that the content
provider can indicate in unencrypted text on the envelope what a
reader has to do decrypt the content.171
b. Digital Watermarks:
A digital watermark 172 can be placed on an image so that any
copies can be identified as being originated from the content provider
or as being copied from an image transmitted to a specified party. 173
This discourages sending the copy on to a third party that might make
copies unauthorized by the content provider. Digital watermark tech-
nology can be combined with a search program that wanders the net
and looks for the provider's watermark, discovering unauthorized use
of the content.
Contrary to the common misunderstandings about self-help sys-
tems, watermarks are not just for content providers, but they can en-
hance a user's capabilities. For example, a user of a program can
determine the source of a watermarked photo and he can communi-
cate directly with the original photo owner.
170 Id.
171 Dam, supra note 157, at 107-08.
172 Definition available at http://lookup.computerlanguage.com/host-app/search (last
visited October 16, 2001) (digital watermark: A pattern of bits embedded into a file used to
identify the source of illegal copies. For example, if a digital watermark is placed into a
master copy of an audio CD or a DVD movie, then all copies of that disc are uniquely
identified. If a licensee were to manufacture and distribute them in areas outside of its
authorized territory, the watermark provides a trace).
173 Kenneth W. Dam, supra note 157, at 108.
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c. Invisible Messages:
Self-help systems can attach invisible messages to content, which
make it impossible to copy the content, or allow only a single copy, or
send a message back to the content provider indicating how many
copies are being made. Locking mechanisms can be classified as a
kind of invisible messages. Content can be locked so that it has to be
unlocked by each recipient. If the content provider transmits content
to an original recipient who unlocks it by payment and then forwards
it to a friend, the friend will receive a locked copy and cannot unlock
it without paying.
The foregoing are just a few variations on the concept of a self-
help system. Almost any conceivable combination or variations of the
ideas discussed above are possible.
2. Vulnerability of Self-Help Systems
Self-help systems are vulnerable to attack, like any electronic on-
line system. Computer programs can be written to detect and strip off
invisible messages. It is anticipated that the development of software
technologies will make it possible to detect digital watermarks and to
wash them out.
3. Fair Use and Self-Help
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act enacted in October 1998
takes the first step in addressing the relationship between fair use and
self-help systems. It applies only to copyright and leaves open the
question of noncopyrightable content. Recognizing the vulnerability
of self-help systems, the Act prohibits circumvention of any 'techno-
logical measure that effectively controls access to a copyrighted work
as well as the manufacture, importation, or offer to the public of any
technology primarily produced for the purpose of such circumven-
tion.174 But since such measures against circumvention may affect the
exercise of fair use rights, the statute establishes a system for deter-
mining whether users of particular classes of works are adversely af-
fected due to such prohibition in their ability to make noninfringing
uses of that particular class of works. 175 Users of such classes of works
are not subject to the circumvention prohibition.17 6 Six categories i.e.
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship and research
are the kinds of potential fair use. 177
174 17 U.S.C. §1201(a)(1)(A) (2003); see also Dam, supra note 157, at 112.
175 17 U.S.C. §1201(a)(1)(B) (2003).
176 See id.
177 17 U.S.C. §107 (2003); see also Dam, supra note 157, at 112.
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4. Moral Rights and Deterrence
Self-help systems can also serve the purposes of moral rights.
Firstly, they can assure attribution to the author, artist, or composer.
Secondly, they can ensure the integrity of documents, images and
music.
Self-help systems also help protect against liability. Problems in-
volving alteration of evidence in litigation can be avoided by time
stamps to documents through invisible messages that can only be re-
moved by a determined attacker.
Self-help systems can also protect artists who do not use self-help
systems. Pirates, if they know that watermarks are being used to trace
piracy, would choose those artistic works without a watermark and
avoid those with a watermark. However, since watermarks are invisi-
ble, piracy of all artistic works will be deterred, not just those with a
watermark.
5. Self-Help and Social Norms
Technology can promote ethics and the public good by reducing
transactions costs. The technology of self-help systems lowers transac-
tions costs especially when combined with digital cash through in-
creasing the convenience of payment. This reduces undesirable social
behavior such as free riding appropriation of content created by
others. As costs go down, it is easier for people to do 'what is right'
(that is, paying or obtaining permission for copying content created by
others). As more people do this others are more likely to follow suit
and thus establish a custom of what is expected and acceptable
behavior.
6. Subject Matter of the Self-Help Systems
"Self-help" refers to technologies and systems designed to protect
content from unauthorized copying.1 78 Dam uses "content" to include
"text, data, images, audio, video, and all of the other media that patrons
of the Web are familiar with. ", 179 He also uses the concept of "content"
in the broadest sense to include "all forms of information and without
distinction as to whether or not the information is legally protected
against access by unintended recipients through intellectual property
rights. 1 8 0
178 Dam, supra note 157, at 103.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 107.
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III.
EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS
The problems with traditional protection for software have led us
to investigate alternative proposals: (1) A market-oriented legal re-
gime, (2) Compensatory liability regimes, (3) Utility models, (4) Di-
rect protection of innovation, and (5) Self-help systems. In order to
find the most appropriate form of protection for software, it is neces-
sary to evaluate these alternatives in light of the software innovation
and the development of software. It is also useful to consider the de-
sign principles and goals discussed in the market-oriented regime (e.g.
to build on existing legal foundations, to focus on the most serious
problems, to be responsive to the characteristics of software, to en-
courage innovation and so on). 181 The most appropriate protection
would not only solve the most critical problems (i.e. discouraging fol-
low-on innovations or causing market failure in the existing legal re-
gimes), but also reflect the characteristics of the development of
software and satisfy as many principles as possible.
A. A Market-Oriented Legal Regime
A market-oriented legal regime describes a number of design
principles and goals, which can be a basis of a new form of legal pro-
tection for software. 182 The market-oriented regime provides a two-
part solution: a protection scheme organized around the source of
value in the software, i.e. program behavior, and a protection scheme
based on principles of market economics. There are a number of pos-
sible legal mechanisms for implementing a market-oriented approach.
The authors of A Manifesto think that the approach that appears to
match best with the design principles is one that would provide
software developers with both a market-preserving period of protec-
tion against cloning and a period of time within which to register their
program design innovations. Registration would provide compensa-
tion for the use of the innovation by a second comer for a period of
time after the expiration of the anti-cloning blocking period.
The market-oriented regime of which subject matter is the 'selec-
tion and arrangement of useful components', and 'compilations of be-
havioral components', well addresses the characteristics of modern
software development, i.e. componentization and reuse. Automatic
Anti-Cloning Protection Followed by an Automatic Royalty-Bearing
License system (Anti-Cloning and Automatic License system) in the
market-oriented regime provides the innovator with some compensa-
181 See supra Part II.A.2.
182 See generally A Manifesto, supra note 6.
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tion from others who use his innovation in the second phase, i.e. the
automatic license period, regardless of commercial success. The Anti-
Cloning and Automatic License system appears to be convenient and
appropriate for the protection of software innovations in that the
speed of software innovation is fast and the lifecycle of software prod-
ucts is short. However, it is difficult to determine the appropriate pe-
riod of automatic anti-cloning protection, as well as the period of and
license fee in the automatic royalty-bearing license. It must be propor-
tionate to the lead-time necessary to give individual innovators the
opportunity to develop a market niche. Moreover, because there is no
registration system, it is difficult to identify what the subject matter to
be protected is, and when the automatic license period commences.
Automatic Protection Complemented by Registration of Innova-
tive Elements system (Automatic Protection and Registration system)
requires registration that would give an extended period of exclusivity
or an automatic royalty-bearing license. 183 Registration might be
available on standard terms after expiration of the unregistered pro-
tection right. The registration system would help establishing a docu-
mented prior art. The automatic royalty-bearing license would remove
the transaction costs of licensing. However, the Automatic Protection
and Registration system has problems in that SMEs do not favor any
formal registration system because they view formal legal rights, par-
ticularly those requiring registration, as expensive, time-consuming,
complex and of limited value. 184
The market-oriented regime falls short in identifying the concrete
method to protect the conceptual metaphors to organize behavior and
bring about a synthetic reality, i.e. virtuality, even though the authors
of A Manifesto regard them valuable. The main problem with the re-
gime is that instead of providing a detailed implementation scheme, it
has only a basic framework for constructing a new form of legal pro-
tection for software innovations. 18 5
B. Compensatory Liability Regime
Reichman's compensatory liability regime correctly addresses the
critical nature of software innovations, i.e. cumulative and incremental
improvements based on componentization and reuse.186 This is be-
cause the liability regime tries to protect cumulative and sequential
working out of common technical trajectories as well as sub-patenta-
183 Automatic royalty-bearing license is similar to Reichman's Liability Regime.
184 See generally available at http://info.sm.umist.ac.uk/esrcip/Projects/L5253004/fi-
nal report.htm (last visited October 8, 2001).
185 A Manifesto, supra note 6, at 2310-2316.
186 Reichman, EXPANDING, supra note 7, at 29.
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ble (or small-scale) innovations that do not rise to the level of novelty
and non-obviousness to be patentable inventions.
Within a designated period of artificial lead-time firms are al-
lowed to borrow one another's sub-patentable innovations only when
they contribute to the costs of development. Second comers do not
have to negotiate permissions. This reduces the transaction costs. The
automatic license in the compensatory liability regime may minimize
the unjustifiable tendency of exclusive property rights to allocate own-
ership of follow-on applications either to the first comer or to second
comers. 187 This approach would provide sub-patentable innovators
with enough lead-time to recoup their investments and make suffi-
cient profits to enable further investments.1 88 Thus, this regime solves
the problem of appropriability in order to encourage investment with-
out necessarily entitling the first comer to all the returns from follow-
on innovation.189 At the same time, this alternative would neither re-
tard scientific research, nor hinder follow-on innovations, nor create
legal barriers to entry. A properly crafted liability rule would offer
those who innovate a way to alleviate market failure.190
However, one of the problems of the liability regime is that it
does not provide a detailed implementation scheme, e.g. an exact defi-
nition of sub-patentable innovations, what constitutes infringement,
and registration procedures. Reichman does not provide concretely
the definition of what makes sub-patentable innovations. Definitions
such as small-scale (or sub-patentable) innovations that do not rise to
the level of novel and non-obvious inventions or original and creative
works of authorship and cumulative and sequential working out of
shared or common technical trajectories are vague. There have been
many debates about the issue of how an invention can be character-
ized as novel, and it is much more difficult to determine the level of
non-obviousness, especially in the software industry. It is not specified
what the lowest level of sub-patentable innovations which would qual-
ify as the subject matter of the liability regime. This needs to be dis-
187 Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic
Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 716 (1996). A property right precludes third parties from
appropriating the object of protection, whereas a liability rule regulates on certain condi-
tions. For example, if one has possession of something such as a car or a house under an
exclusive property right, another person ordinarily cannot take it without permission, but
under a liability rule, others may engage in acts that create risks of harm and thus consti-
tute probabilistic invasions of property interests, while obligating them to pay damages for
harm under specified circumstances.
188 J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND.
L. REV. 51 (1997), available at http://eon.law.harvard.edu/h2o/property/alternatives/
reichman.html (last visited July 21, 2001).
189 Reichman, supra note 7, at 29.
190 Id. at 51.
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cussed because not all kinds of selections, adding, rearrangements,
modifications and adjustments should be protected. There should be
minimum requirements to be regarded as sub-patentable. 191 These as-
pects are closely related to infringement. For examples, simple change
of components, which are equivalents, or simple modifications of
known elements without any resulting effects, should not be regarded
as the subject matter of liability protection. The problems with regis-
tration have been discussed above.
For the compensatory liability regime to be employed as an ac-
tual protection system, these problems need to be addressed.
C. Utility Models
The main features of the utility model, compared with a patent,
are a lower level of inventiveness than that required for a patent, the
absence of prior examination, and a short protection period. These
features appear to reflect the characteristics of software innovations.
However, the main problem with the utility model is the fact that its
subject matter is mainly devices relating to the shape, or construction
of articles, or a combination of such things. Methods of construction
or articles not having a certain shape are excluded from utility model
protection. Thus, protecting software by the utility model system ap-
pears to be inappropriate, since software has no shape and is an exe-
cution of complex logic. However, in the sense that programs are
machines, 192 and that writing programs is an industrial compilation of
sub-components, which is similar to the design of physical machines,
software can be regarded as a device having virtual shape.
Another important problem of the utility model is that it is a pro-
prietary right. The exclusive property regimes uniformly impose on
the process of follow-on innovation unacceptably high social costs. 193
An exclusive property regime fails to solve the problem of follow-on
applications of sub-patentable know-how to marketed products. Any
system that protects sub-patentable applications of technical know-
how by means of a property right will tend to reward individual inno-
vators as if they had produced major innovations. 194 That is, by re-
warding individuals with strong exclusive property rights for routine
applications of the community's technical know-how, the system tends
191 PATENT LAWS Art. 29 (S. Korea) (when an invention could easily have been made
prior to the filing of the patent application by a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which the invention pertains, a patent shall not be granted for such an inven-
tion)[Requirements for patents].
192 See generally, A Manifesto, supra note 6.
193 Reichman, supra note 7, at 28.
194 Id. at 37.
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to make that shared know-how artificially scarce. As the tiny bundles
of small-scale innovation covered by strong IPRs and strong contrac-
tual rights increase, the community's shared know-how is divided into
ever-smaller pieces, which are withdrawn from the public domain. 195
This process produces a tangled web of property rights and constitutes
a barrier to entry and a disincentive to further small-scale innovation.
The need to bargain around an exclusive property right complicates
routine business transactions and adds new risks of infringement liti-
gation to the innate risks of predicting market success. In sum, prop-
erty-based rules impede follow-on developments, ignore the
significant contributions of the public domain, and increase transac-
tion costs.
In the computer software industry, the patent (and copyright)
system is creating a patent thicket.1 96 The vast number of patents cur-
rently being issued creates a real danger that a single product or pro-
cess will infringe many patents. 197 Moreover, many patents cover
products or processes already being widely used when the patents are
issued, and they make it harder for the companies actually manufac-
turing products to invent around the patents. Furthermore, a patent
holder can seek injunctive relief, i.e. can threaten to shut down the
operations of the infringing company. There have been many concerns
about a patent thicket being created by e-commerce and BMPs. In
this state of affairs, the introduction of the utility model that is also a
proprietary right would mean establishing utility model thicket 98 on
the top of patent thicket. It would make matters worse.
As for the issue of the lower level of inventiveness in the utility
model, it is almost the same as that of non-obviousness in sub-patenta-
ble innovations discussed above.
D. Direct Protection of Innovation
Direct protection of innovation aims at protecting innovations
rather than inventions. Innovation patents or warrants would be given
195 Id. at 38.
196 Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools and Stan-
dard Setting (2001), available at http://haas.berkeley.edu/-shapiro/thicket.pdf ("patent
thicket" means an overlapping set of patent rights requiring that those seeking to commer-
cialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees. Cross-licensing and patent
pools are two natural and effective methods used by market participants to cut through the
patent thicket).
197 Almost all authors of software will involuntarily infringe a software patent when they
publish their software.
198 Shapiro, supra note 195, at 2 (the term "utility model thicket" is devised by the
author in order to mean the thicket created by a great number of utility models).
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to the initial act of commercializing computer programs. 199 Direct pro-
tection by an innovation patent is similar to copyright, which protects
the work itself.200
The direct protection effectively protects incremental innova-
tions, which become cumulatively more important in the modern
software industry, by giving up the "inventive step" criterion.20 1 The
innovation patent can protect many incremental innovations such as
transposition, application, identification, formulation, selection, sim-
plification, combination and aggregation of software components.
Modifications of software components, which already exist, can obtain
an innovation patent if it is not a technical equivalent of an option
claim of the initial innovation patent.20 2 In other words, in the case of
a second innovator who has brought an incremental change to a pro-
tected product, protection will be granted for the incremental change
(with the requirement that the innovation cannot be put into practical
effect without infringing the first innovator's right). The use of the
incremental improvement will thus depend on agreement between the
two parties. The relationship between the first comer and second com-
ers is similar to that of the liability regime.20 3 Thus, the direct protec-
tion system solves the problem of how to enable companies to
appropriate the fruits of their investment in sequential innovation
without impeding follow-on innovation.20 4
In the direct protection system, fear of litigation greatly dimin-
ishes compared with the classical patent system. A competitor can fol-
low by innovating around a copy claim by changing the product in the
ways that are not technically equivalent. Alternatively, he can seek a
license under one of the option claims. A license to use the alterna-
tives covered by option claims must be granted. Moreover, in the war-
rant system, any product which was on the market at the time of the
application for a warrant cannot be affected, and any product which is
the subject of an innovation warrant cannot be held to infringe any
other warrant.
The elimination of the warrant-holders' burden of protecting
their rights makes the differences in their size and their capacity to
pursue litigation irrelevant. Due to the monopoly conferred by its in-
199 Direct protection of innovation by warrants is achieved by making the subject matter
an investment that turns an idea into concrete reality.
200 Kingston, supra note 8, at 39 (copyright does not protect any idea or concept for the
work which an author might have in mind).
201 Kronz, supra note 8, at 267, 271.
202 Id. at 271.
203 See supra Part II.B.
204 Reichman, supra note 7, at 23.
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novation patent or warrant, SMEs are the equal of the large firms as
far as a particular innovation is concerned. This is very desirable be-
cause SMEs are great source of innovations, 20 5 and because this
makes it easy to establish a new company and makes large companies
more innovative. Moreover, the innovation patent and the innovation
warrant are incontestable unless obtained by fraud.20 6 Incontestability
and freedom from litigation (in the innovation warrant) can be a good
base for investment.
One of the main problems of the Kronz system exists in the ex-
amination of the novelty criterion. A document carries weight in the
examination to the extent that it provides evidence of prior reduction
to practice of the concept, together with its actual use in public. 20 7 It
would be very difficult for an examiner to find a document with the
evidence of prior reduction to practice and actual use in public, since
there is no established prior art of this kind. Establishing prior art with
such evidence would be a difficult job. Without an established prior
art, accurate examination of the innovation patent applications would
be unimaginable. There is a similar problem in the innovation warrant
system. In the innovation warrant, novelty depends on the
purchasability of the subject matter of a warrant application in the
ordinary course of trade. The purchasability of software differs de-
pending on time. Software that was purchasable may become other-
wise as time goes by. Finding a prior art with the evidence of the
purchasability and establishing a prior art with such evidence for the
examination are also a difficult job, especially when combined with
the typical problems with the prior art in the software industry.
In determining whether or not an object belongs within the scope
of the protection of an innovation warrant, it is necessary to decide
whether the object is a "commercial equivalent." However, as time
goes by, an object, which constituted infringement before, may be-
come other than a "commercial equivalent", according to the chang-
ing market, and vice versa. Moreover, when it comes to computer
programs, the scope of "commercial equivalence" becomes more
broad and vague. It is difficult to determine whether a computer pro-
gram belongs within the scope of "commercial equivalent" of another
computer program to which a warrant is granted, because it includes
consideration of the time and the changing market, which the software
product belongs to. Furthermore, considering the realities of the de-
velopment of software, the criterion of "commercial equivalent" is so
205 See supra Part II.C.3.
206 However, due to the incontestability, the problem of bad innovation patents exists
when innovation patents were granted to already known innovations.
207 Kingston, supra note 8, at 48.
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broad as to include almost all incremental improvements, which have
been made on the top of existing software products. In this respect,
there would be many disputes.
The two proposals by Kronz and Kingston, however, are so well
equipped with details of their implementation that they may be re-
garded as being capable of supplementing or replacing the classical
patent system in this field. Moreover, they are so similar to the classi-
cal patent system that existing patent offices could take over the job of
the direct protection system without establishing an Innovation Office
separately. The patent examiners would be able to deal with the inno-
vation applications with some training. The public as well would not
have much difficulty in applying for an innovation patent or warrant,
because they are already accustomed to the classical patent system.
These features enhance the feasibility of the two proposals.
E. Self-help Systems
Self-help systems will reduce the incidence of copyright viola-
tions. They are one of the crucial success factors in e-commerce. The
systems can facilitate implementation of many of the ideas underlying
pro-competitive and fair use ideas embedded in intellectual property
law.20 8 Self-help systems can harness the features of digital copies that
are generally identical with one another. The technology of self-help
systems lowers transactions costs and thereby reduces undesirable so-
cial behavior such as free riding appropriation. As transaction costs go
down, it is easier for people to do the right thing. Self-help systems are
not just for software providers, but also for the users' benefit.
The majority of SMEs regard technical systems of protection as
well as copyright and licensing as the most useful methods of protec-
tion.20 9 The survey210 on how SMEs rank the importance of methods
of IP protection reveals that 24% of SMEs regarded technical systems
of protection as the most important, and 52% of those interviewed
considered market niche and technical systems of protection as impor-
tant methods of protection.211 This data suggests that self-help systems
are an appropriate protection form for software.
Self-help systems, however, are vulnerable to attack. Develop-
ment of software technologies would make it possible to detect digital
watermarks and to wash them out. In spite of their advantages, de-
208 Dam, supra note 157, at 110.
209 Adams and Tang, supra note 117, at viii, 58.
210 The research sponsored by the UK Economic and Social Research Council, under
the £1.2 million program Intellectual Property Initiative.
211 Adams and Tang, supra note 117, at 19 (27% of SMEs ranked licensing as the most
important means of protection; and 21%, copyright).
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pending on self-help systems completely may result in market failure,
especially when software developers are SMEs which have a limited
ability to use the technology of self-help systems, and when large com-
panies, which have enough resources to make the self-help technology
useless, are trying to free ride the computer programs developed by





In conclusion, while the market-oriented regime provides a basic
framework for constructing a new form of legal protection for
software, the regime does not have enough details for a model stat-
ute.212 Reichman's compensatory liability regime solves the critical is-
sue of the relationship between the first comer and second comers in
sequential innovation, i.e. encouraging innovation without impeding
follow-on innovation. The liability regime, however, does not provide
detailed implementation proposals. Thus, both the market-oriented
regime and the liability regime are not feasible in the near future. The
utility model makes the patent thicket more complex by establishing
utility model thicket which impedes follow-on innovations. Thus, the
utility model system does not solve the most serious problem of the
existing legal regimes. The direct protection of innovation not only
solves the most serious problems, but also satisfies more goals and
principles for a market-oriented approach than any other alternative.
For example, the system effectively protects incremental innovations
by solving the most critical problems of the classical patent system,
which discourages software innovation by impeding follow-on innova-
tion. The system can be established on existing legal foundations. The
system has many other advantages such as reduced fear of litigation,
elimination of the warrant-holder's burden of protecting his right, in-
contestability, feasibility (due to a detailed scheme of implementa-
tion) and familiarity (of examiners and the public).
Consideration of these advantages leads us to choose direct pro-
tection of innovation as the most appropriate form of protection for
software. However, as discussed above, in establishing a new legal re-
gime for software protection, the direct protection system needs more
development concerning the novelty criterion, the issue of prior art,
the scope of protection (e.g. "technical equivalence" or "commercial
212 A Manifesto, supra note 6, at 2310-2316.
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equivalence") and so on. Complementary aspects of the two proposals
by Kronz and Kingston should also be considered and the better ele-
ments of each adopted. For example, the criterion of "technical equiv-
alence" appears to be more recommendable for the protection of
software than that of "commercial equivalence". In terms of the nov-
elty criterion, the criterion of initial commercialization in the innova-
tion patent, which is similar to copyright system, appears to be more
appropriate for the software protection than that of purchasability in
the innovation warrant. Elimination of the warrant-holder's burden in
the innovation warrant is good for SMEs to be treated equally to large
firms with regard to a particular innovation.
B. Suggestions for the Introduction of the Direct Protection
Computer programs freely move around the world through the
Internet. If innovative software is protected in only one national juris-
diction, that would not help the innovator substantially because the
software would be copied in the other jurisdictions without any re-
striction. Development of the Internet 213 and information technology
leads to consider worldwide protection for software, i.e. unitary inno-
vation patents based on the World Innovation Patent system. 214
In introducing the Direct Protection of Innovation at interna-
tional level, there could be two options: one is to establish a world
unified Innovation Office in which a unitary innovation patent is
granted; the other is to establish national innovation patent offices in
which a unitary innovation patent is filed, published and examined
based on the World Innovation Patent system. Both of the two options
require a Software Innovation Convention, which is based on the con-
cepts of the direct protection of innovation, between member coun-
tries. A main problem of the latter choice is difficulties in maintaining
consistency in the examination in every jurisdiction. It would be ex-
tremely difficult to keep an equal level of examination quality and
application of criteria throughout all member countries. Close links
between national patent offices would be essential to exchange the
information such as prior art, applications, publications or examina-
tion results. In order to accomplish a satisfactory cooperation, infor-
mation networks between national patent offices would be necessary.
If a unified Innovation Office is established, consistency and qual-
ity in the examination could be secured, because standardized educa-
213 The Internet is often described as the biggest copy machine.
214 Gerald J. Mossinghoff, World Patent System Circa 20XX, A.D., (edited transcript of
remarks delivered to the Yale Law and Technology Society) 1 YALE SYMP. L. & TECH. 3
(1999).
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tion for examiners, establishment of relevant prior art, uniform
examination guidelines and so on could easily be accomplished. Uni-
form examination is very important in the software innovation pat-
ents, because if an innovation patent were granted to a computer
program, it would be valid in the all member countries. Thus, the au-
thor suggests the following:
1. A world unified Innovation Office is established at the
W]P0 215 where filings may be made to grant protection in
every country based on a Software Innovation Convention.
According to the Convention, a member may file a single ap-
plication to the Innovation Office and receive protection in
each country.216
2. The Innovation Office deals with main administration such as
examination, publication and issuance of innovation patents.
3. In order to cooperate with the central Office, local innovation
offices are established at each member country's patent office.
The local innovation offices would connect between domestic
applicants and the central Office. The local offices would re-
ceive applications and send them to the central Office. They
would also satisfy individual needs of applicants.
4. An application can be made by filing either in the Innovation
Office directly or in any member country's innovation office,
which would transfer the application to the central Innovation
Office.
5. A worldwide search is performed at the Innovation Office.
6. The definition of novelty extends to "not available in the ordi-
nary course of trade within the Community's boundary" or
"anywhere in the world" when the Community comprises
worldwide countries as the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)
does.217
7. Innovation patents are granted when computer programs are
initially commercialized within the Community's boundary
(First-to-Commercialize Priority System). 218 A useful legal ef-
fect, however, is attached to the date of filing in the innovation
office.219 When the date of commercialization is not clear, the
filing date is adopted.
8. The scope of protection is determined by "technical
equivalence".
215 WIPO is a UN agency headquartered in Geneva, established in 1967. As of July
1998, it had 171 members. Joint WTO-WIPO Press Release, July 21, 1998.
216 See e.g, Mark Aaron Paley, A Model Software,12 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 301 (1996).
217 Kingston, supra note 8, at 63.
218 The term, "First-to-Commercialize Priority System", is devised by the author in line
with the term, first-to-file priority system.
219 Kronz, supra note 8, at 263.
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9. The enforcement of the innovation patents is publicly ren-
dered by the cooperation between the central Innovation Of-
fice and the local innovation offices.
10. Once granted, the innovation patent is incontestable unless ac-
quired by fraud.
11. For the Innovation Office to work effectively, it is necessary to
establish an inventory of computer programs that are used, or
have been publicly used in the Community.220 The digital prior
art database would be accessible via the Internet from the local
innovation offices or anywhere in the world.
12. Examiners of the Innovation Office are composed of experts
from the member countries.
13. The Innovation Office functions as the software library and li-
censing agency. Anyone interested in a program should be
able to license the program with licensing fee, which should be
transferred to the program owner.221 The program owner
should pay a certain amount of administration fee to the Inno-
vation Office.
14. English is used as the official language. This reduces adminis-
tration costs and possibility of misunderstanding between ap-
plicants and the Innovation Office.222
15. A world innovation patent court or an arbitration tribunal
should be established at the WIPO.
16. At the outset, groups of countries may form a Community, a
single domestic area for innovation patents.223 Afterwards, the
Community may include more countries widely. Leadership
toward the world system would be coming from three jurisdic-
tions, i.e. Europe, the US and Japan, by establishing a trilateral
innovation patent system covering the three jurisdictions. Eu-
rope, the US and Japan would need to negotiate a convention,
e.g. Software Innovation Convention, to set up the trilateral
system. Other countries should be permitted to join this
system.
220 Id. at 270.
221 Jozef Halbersztadt, Remarks on the Patentability of Computer Software - History,
Status, Developments, available at http://swpat.ffii.org/penmi/linuxtag-2001/jh/indexen.html
(last visited December 15, 2003).
222 Gerald J. Mossinghoff, World Patent System Circa 20XX, A.D., 38 IDEA 529, 552
(1998) (more than 75% of all technical information is published in English first, and almost
90% of all technical information on the Internet is in English).
223 See generally Kingston, supra note 8.
